Investor and client responses to the first PCAOB sanction and Part II disclosure of a Big N Auditor by Muriel, Leah Elena
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative 
Exchange 
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 
8-2013 
Investor and client responses to the first PCAOB sanction and 
Part II disclosure of a Big N Auditor 
Leah Elena Muriel 
lmuriel@utk.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Muriel, Leah Elena, "Investor and client responses to the first PCAOB sanction and Part II disclosure of a 
Big N Auditor. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2013. 
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2466 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee 
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact 
trace@utk.edu. 
To the Graduate Council: 
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Leah Elena Muriel entitled "Investor and client 
responses to the first PCAOB sanction and Part II disclosure of a Big N Auditor." I have examined 
the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be 
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a 
major in Business Administration. 
Joseph V. Carcello, Major Professor 
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: 
Terry L. Neal, Joan M. Heminway, Bruce K. Behn 
Accepted for the Council: 
Carolyn R. Hodges 
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School 
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.) 
 
Investor and client responses to the first PCAOB sanction 





A Dissertation Presented for the 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Degree 























Copyright © 2013 by Leah Muriel 







































I am grateful for the support and direction provided by my committee: Joe Carcello (Chair), Bruce 
Behn, Joan Heminway, and Terry Neal. I would also like to thank Nelson Carrasco as well as 
workshop participants at Oklahoma State University, University of Alabama, University of 
















































 I examine investor and client responses to the first PCAOB sanction and the first release of “Part II 
– Issues Related to Quality Controls” of a Big N auditor. I examine the following: the stock market 
reaction to the Part II disclosure, investors’ perceptions of earnings quality after both events using 
the earnings response coefficient (ERC), and client dismissals after the sanction. I find that 
December year-end clients that operate in highly litigated industries or those with auditor tenure 
greater than three years are more likely to dismiss Deloitte in the post-sanction period. For the 
sample of U.S. highly litigated clients, the odds of Deloitte being dismissed after the PCOAB 
sanction are 180% higher than the odds of other Big N auditors being dismissed, after controlling 
for differences across time. For the sample of U.S. clients with auditor tenure greater than three 
years, the odds of Deloitte being dismissed after the PCOAB sanction are 107% higher than the 
odds of other Big N auditors being dismissed, after controlling for differences across time. Unlike 
Dee et al. (2011) who find that Deloitte clients experienced a negative market reaction to the 
PCAOB sanction announcement, I find limited evidence that the market reacted to the release of the 
first Big N Part II PCAOB inspection report. I also do not find strong evidence of a decrease in 
investors’ perceptions of earning quality after the PCAOB sanction or after the public release of 
Part II. I contribute to the literature by providing evidence on whether these first time PCAOB 
disclosures are informative to clients and investors. This is particularly relevant given the 
perception that information regarding audit firm quality is currently insufficient, that prior research 
regarding the content of PCAOB inspection reports has been mixed and mostly generalizable to 
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     One of the many changes implemented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), was the 
establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), an organization 
charged with monitoring public accounting firms and their audits of public companies. Section 
104(b) of SOX requires registered public accounting firms that regularly provide audit reports for 
more than 100 issuers to have an annual inspection by the PCAOB; other registered public 
accounting firms have an inspection every three years.1 Concerns have been raised by investors, 
regulatory officials, and accounting professionals regarding the content of the inspection reports and 
the overall information about audit firms that has been made available to the public under the 
PCAOB regime (PCAOB Investor Advisory Group 2012; U.S. Treasury 2008; BDO Seidman 2009; 
Glover 2009). The Treasury Department’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 2008 
report noted that, “Currently, there is minimal publicly available information regarding indicators of 
audit quality at individual auditing firms”.  
     Consistent with these concerns, prior academic research has been mixed regarding the 
information content of the PCAOB inspection reports, with the results primarily generalizable to 
firms whose auditors are not inspected annually. Lennox and Pittman (2010) demonstrate that 
inspection reports are not informative to client auditor choices, for both large and small auditors. On 
the other hand, Abbott et al. (2008) find that clients of small auditors with GAAP deficiencies 
identified in their PCAOB inspection report are more likely to switch auditors if their audit 
committee is fully independent and has at least one financial expert. Additionally, Offermanns and 
Peek (2011) find a significant stock market reaction to the release of first and second time 
inspection reports and that the magnitude of the response is higher for reports with GAAP 
                                                          
1
 The smaller firms are subject to triennial inspections if they audit at least one issuer or play a role in auditing 
at least one issuer. 
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deficiencies. The authors emphasize that the results particularly apply to non-Big 4 auditors.2 The 
findings in these studies are based on “Part I” of PCAOB inspection reports; the portion of the 
report that is always made available to the public. PCAOB inspection reports contain two parts: Part 
I describes individual engagement weaknesses identified during the inspection process, but the 
identity of the clients are kept anonymous. Part II describes issues related to quality controls. This 
section is not made public unless the PCAOB determines that the accounting firm has not made 
sufficient remediation efforts to address the issues identified in Part II. 
     On December 10, 2007 the PCAOB announced its first sanction against a Big N auditor, 
imposing a $1 million civil money penalty on Deloitte and Touche, LLP (Deloitte).3 In addition to 
paying the fine, Deloitte established a Leadership Oversight Committee for audit partners and 
directors to address “deployment and supervision issues relating to audit partners and directors 
about whom quality or other audit performance concerns have been identified” (PCAOB 2007). In 
an unrelated matter, nearly four years later (on October 17, 2011), new portions of the 2007 Deloitte 
PCAOB inspection report, “Part II - Issues Related to Quality Controls” (also referred to as “Part 
II” or “Part II disclosure”), describing criticisms of Deloitte’s system of quality control, were made 
public because of insufficient remediation efforts.  Information on both disclosures is available on 
the PCAOB website and was publicized in widely circulated newspapers such as The Wall Street 
Journal, The New York Times, and The Washington Post. In addition, Senator Claire McCaskill, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, wrote a letter to Deloitte in response to 
the Part II disclosure. The Senator asked for further information on the audits Deloitte performs for 
                                                          
2
 The Big 4 auditors are Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. They are referred to as “Big N” auditors in the accounting literature and 
hereafter, I refer to this group as such. 
3
 In the U.S., Deloitte LLP is the member firm of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited. Deloitte LLP does not 
provide services to clients. Auditing services are provided by Deloitte & Touche LLP, which is the name that 
appears on the PCAOB inspection report and other information released about the firm. However, the firm is 
collectively referred to as Deloitte and I refer to it as such in the remainder of the paper. 
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the federal government stating that, “ … the issues raised in the report raise serious questions 
regarding the integrity of all audits conducted by Deloitte.”4 
     These two disclosures reveal information about Deloitte’s quality in performing its audits that is 
not provided in the typical PCAOB inspection report. To assess if these disclosures are informative, 
I examine the following: the stock market reaction to the Part II disclosure, investors’ perceptions of 
earnings quality after both events using the earnings response coefficient (ERC), and client 
dismissals after the sanction.5 I contribute to the literature by providing evidence on whether these 
first time disclosures about a Big N auditor are informative to clients and investors, which is 
particularly relevant given the perception that information regarding audit firm quality is currently 
insufficient, that prior research has been mixed and mostly generalizable to smaller auditors, and 
that the Big N audit 98% of the total market capitalization of U.S. based issuers (PCAOB 2008a). 
This study is also important because PCAOB inspections, and the output of those inspections, 
potentially impact auditors’ incentives; and high-quality audits are necessary for well-functioning 
capital markets (Watts and Zimmerman (1986) as summarized by DeFond 2010).  
           I find a client response to the PCAOB sanction for firms with two distinct characteristics; 
those that operate in highly litigated industries or those with auditor tenure greater than three years. 
December year-end clients with these attributes are more likely to dismiss Deloitte in the post-
sanction period. For the sample of U.S. highly litigated clients, the odds of Deloitte being dismissed 
after the PCOAB sanction are 180% higher than the odds of other Big N auditors being dismissed, 
after controlling for differences across time.6 The probability of Deloitte being dismissed in the 
post-sanction period is 9.02% if the client operates in highly litigated industries, while the 
                                                          
4
 The information provided by Deloitte revealed that the federal government had paid them $62 million from 
2006 through part of 2011.  The senator’s letter to Deloitte and Deloitte’s response can be found at 
http://mccaskill.senate.gov/?p=subcommittee_on_contracting_oversight. The request was reported in the 
WSJ, Rapoport (2011). 
5 Dee et al. (2011) examine the stock market reaction to the PCAOB sanction and data is not yet available to 
study client dismissals associated with Part II.  
6
 This result is from the odds ratio which is 2.8. This result could also be stated as follows: for the sample of 
highly litigated clients, the odds of Deloitte being dismissed after the PCAOB sanction are 2.8 times the odds 
of other Big N clients being dismissed, after controlling for differences across time. 
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probability for other Big N auditors is 3.79%. For the sample of U.S. clients with auditor tenure 
greater than three years, the odds of Deloitte being dismissed after the PCOAB sanction are 107% 
higher than the odds of other Big N auditors being dismissed, after controlling for differences across 
time.7 The probability of Deloitte being dismissed in the post-Sanction period is 5.03% if the client 
has engaged Deloitte for more than three years, while the probability for other Big N auditors is 
3.39%. Concerns about auditor reputation, the perceived credibility of financial statements and the 
potential for shareholder litigation are potential factors driving this result.  Thus, the release of new 
quality control information by the PCAOB is associated with an increase in client dismissals, 
particularly where litigation risk is higher.  
     Unlike Dee et al. (2011) who find that Deloitte clients experienced a negative market reaction to 
the PCAOB sanction announcement, I find limited evidence that the market reacted to the release of 
the first Big N Part II PCAOB inspection report. This is somewhat surprising because the 
information in the Part II disclosure (quality control issues regarding the auditing process) appears 
to be more likely to affect the quality of engagements across the firm, compared with the 
information in the PCAOB sanction (supervision of partners and directors). Although I find limited 
results in the entire population of U.S. and Non U.S. Deloitte clients, I do find that there is a 
negative market reaction around the release of Part II for Deloitte China clients. I also find no 
strong evidence to support a decrease in the perceived earnings quality of Deloitte clients after 
either the PCAOB sanction or the release of the Part II disclosure. 
     The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a discussion of the 
background and hypotheses.  Sections III, IV, and V present the research design and findings for the 
market reaction, earnings response coefficient, and auditor change/client dismissal analyses, 
respectively. Section VI presents results for the replication of the market reaction analysis of the 
Dee et al. (2011) study and section VII summarizes and concludes the study. 
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 This result is from the odds ratio which is 2.07. This result could also be stated as follows: for the sample of 
clients with tenure greater than three years, the odds of Deloitte being dismissed after the PCAOB sanction 
are 2.07 times the odds of other Big N auditors being dismissed, after controlling for differences across time. 
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II. Background and Hypothesis Development 
Self-Regulation and Independent Regulation 
     Prior to the passage of SOX, the public accounting profession was self-regulated through a peer 
review system. Although concerns existed regarding its effectiveness (Fogarty 1996), prior research 
has shown that peer review reports predict audit failures (Casterella et al. 2009) and are informative 
to a clients’ choice of auditor by providing information about the quality of audit firms (Hilary and 
Lennox 2005). Consequently, peer review reports were useful for providing information on actual 
audit quality and in perceptions of audit quality. One of the many changes implemented by SOX 
was the establishment of the PCAOB, an organization charged with monitoring public accounting 
firms and their audits of public companies.8 The peer review system is still in effect, however, its 
inspections are now of non-SEC issuers.  
     The difference between the two types of inspection reports is that peer review reports provide an 
overall opinion on the firm’s quality control system and disclose quality control weaknesses. 
However, the PCAOB reports only disclose individual engagement weaknesses; there is no overall 
quality control opinion and the quality control weaknesses in Part II are only disclosed if they are 
not remediated to the PCAOB’s satisfaction within 12 months of the report date.9 The differences 
between these two  reports  is  important because Lennox and Pittman (2010) find that PCAOB 
(Part I) inspection reports lack “information value” 10 and are not informative to client audit firm 
choices. They conclude this is due to the absence of information regarding the quality control of the 
accounting firm.       
                                                          
8
 The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 also gave the PCAOB authority to inspect the audits of brokers 
and dealers. There is currently an interim inspection program with a permanent program expected to be 
established in 2013. 
9
 The accounting firm has the option to request the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to review the 
decision to release Part II in a nonpublic process. Therefore, there can be a considerable period of time 
between when quality control criticisms are first identified and when they are made public. Sanctions by the 
PCAOB against accounting firms are also kept confidential until a final resolution is reached, which can also 
result in significant delays in releasing timely information to the public. 
10




     PCAOB sanctions and Part II quality control disclosures reveal information about the firm’s 
quality in performing its audits that is not provided in the typical inspection report (Part I). They 
provide an additional opportunity to assess if PCAOB disclosures are informative to clients and 
investors. This is important because of concerns raised by investors, regulatory officials and 
accounting professionals regarding the content of PCAOB inspection reports and the overall 
information about audit firms that is publicly available under the PCAOB regime (PCAOB Investor 
Advisory Group 2012: U.S. Treasury 2008; BDO Seidman 2009; Glover et al. 2009). It is also 
important because prior research has been mixed regarding the information content of PCAOB 
inspection reports as well as the fact that these are first time disclosures about a Big N firm and the 
Big N audit 98 percent of the total market capitalization of U.S. based issuers (PCAOB 2008a).  
The first PCAOB sanction and Part II quality disclosure of a Big N auditor 
     On December 10, 2007 the PCAOB announced its first sanction against a Big N auditor, 
imposing a $1 million civil money penalty on Deloitte and Touche, LLP (Deloitte).11 The sanction 
was prompted by Deloitte’s failures in the 2003 Ligand Pharmaceuticals Incorporated audit; 
specifically, the failure to exercise due professional care in performing the audit, to obtain sufficient 
competent evidential matter to support the audit opinion, and to staff the audit with an engagement 
partner that had the necessary competence to evaluate the audit evidence (PCAOB 2007).12 The 
PCAOB highlighted Deloitte’s failure in leaving the engagement partner in charge of the Ligand 
audit with no additional supervision when concerns had previously been raised at the local, 
regional, and national office levels regarding this individual’s competence, causing some of 
Deloitte’s management to conclude that this partner should be removed from public company 
                                                          
11
 Subsequent to this, there have been two other PCAOB sanctions involving Big N auditors. On April 5, 2011 
the PCAOB announced a sanction against several firms collectively referred to as “Pricewaterhouse India”  
(this is a different entity from Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP in the U.S.) with a civil money penalty of $1.5 
million; and on February 8, 2012, the PCAOB announced a sanction against Ernst & Young, LLP with a civil 
money penalty of $2 million. 
12 A sanction was also imposed on the same date against James L. Fazio, the engagement partner on the 
Ligand audit. Mr. Fazio was barred from being associated with a public accounting firm (but after two years 
can file a petition to the PCAOB to remove the restriction). 
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audits. In addition to paying the fine, Deloitte established a Leadership Oversight Committee for 
audit partners and directors to address “deployment and supervision issues relating to audit partners 
and directors about whom quality or other audit performance concerns have been identified” 
(PCAOB 2007).  PCAOB Chairman Mark Olson said “that the board's disciplinary measures are 
needed to ensure public confidence isn't undermined by firms or individual auditors who fail to 
meet ‘high standards of quality and competence’ ” (Burns 2007). 
     In an unrelated matter, nearly four years later (on October 17, 2011), new portions of the 2007 
Deloitte PCAOB inspection report, “Part II - Issues Related to Quality Controls”, describing 
criticisms over Deloitte’s system of quality control were made public because of insufficient 
remediation efforts by the firm. The 2007 inspection report was originally issued on May 19, 2008; 
at that time Part II was not publicly revealed. Deloitte had 12 months from that date to remediate 
the quality control issues and to avoid public disclosure. This was the first time Part II of a PCAOB 
annual inspection report of a Big N firm was released to the public.13 The criticisms involved 
quality control procedures regarding auditing significant estimates, income tax balances, the 
issuer’s use of specialists, as well as ineffective use of consultations within the firm, and ineffective 
monitoring of the internal inspections of its foreign member firms. The PCAOB’s report found that, 
“these deficiencies may result, in part, from a Firm culture that allows, or tolerates, audit 
approaches that do not consistently emphasize the need for an appropriate level of critical analysis 
and collection of objective evidence, and that rely largely on management representations” 
(PCAOB 2008b).  The following was the PCAOB’s statement on the day these Part II disclosures 
were made public.  
"The quality control remediation process is central to the Board's efforts to cause firms to improve 
the quality of their audits and thereby better protect investors. The Board therefore takes very 
                                                          
13
 The PCAOB also released two Part II disclosures for PriceWaterhouseCoopers in March of 2013. There 
have been approximately 100 instances of Part II disclosures, with some firms having multiple disclosures. 
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seriously the importance of firms making sufficient progress on quality control issues identified in 
an inspection report in the 12 months following the report. Particularly with the largest firms, which 
are inspected annually, the Board devotes considerable time and resources to critically evaluating 
whether the firm did in fact make sufficient progress in that period. The Board can and does make 
the relevant criticisms public when a firm has failed to do so." 14 
     Dee et al. (2011) is the first study to examine any effects associated with the Deloitte PCAOB 
sanction, finding that Deloitte clients experienced a significant negative stock market reaction when 
the 2007 sanction was made public. In addition, there was no market reaction by the entire Deloitte 
client base to event dates related to the specific audit failure prompting the sanction (Ligand audit), 
leading to the conclusion that the sanction provided new information regarding Deloitte’s quality 
control procedures. In a cross-sectional analysis, they find that financially distressed firms react 
more negatively to this disclosure, consistent with both a perceived negative reputation effect and a 
perceived loss of insurance value provided by the Deloitte audit. 
     I contribute to the literature by further examining investor and client responses to both the 
sanction and the Part II disclosure in order to provide evidence about whether these first time 
disclosures are informative. I specifically examine if there is a negative stock market reaction by 
Deloitte clients to the Part II disclosure announcement and if there is an increase in client dismissals 
at Deloitte associated with the sanction. Using the earnings response coefficient, I also examine if 
the sanction and the Part II disclosure are associated with a decrease in perceived earnings quality 
for clients audited by Deloitte. Below is a summary of the methods tested for each event. 
  Market Reaction ERC Auditor Changes 
Sanction Dee et al. 2011 X X 
Part II Disclosure X X Data not yet available 
 
                                                          
14




Prior Research and Hypotheses 
      “As Wang, Lo and Hui (2003, p. 76) argue ‘Reputation plays an especially important strategic 
role in service markets because the pre-purchase evaluation of service quality is necessarily vague 
and incomplete’. Due to their intangibility, the quality of services may be more difficult to evaluate 
by consumers and thus service firms may be more likely to feel the effects of reputation loss than 
other types of firms [Fombrun, 1996; Kim and Choi, 2003]” (Walsh 2009). These views are also 
consistent with remarks made in 2007 by PCAOB founding board member Bill Gradison that  “[the 
PCAOB] prefers giving audit firms a 12-month grace period to quietly fix problems rather than 
make them public when they happen, since reputation is so important in a field like auditing” 
(Stuart 2007). 
     Managers prepare financial statements and engage an auditor to express an opinion as to whether 
they are a fair representation of the financial position of the company in order to reduce agency 
conflicts between managers and owners/creditors (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Francis and Wilson 
1988). Furthermore, engaging what is considered to be a high quality auditor can add credibility to 
the company’s financial statements by reducing uncertainty and instilling confidence in the 
accuracy of the information being reported (Wilson and Grimlund 1990). If however, the auditor’s 
reputation suffers a loss, it can lead to negative perceptions regarding the quality of the work 
performed and in turn the perceived reliability of the financial statements of its clients (Wilson and 
Grimlund 1990), perhaps reducing the value of the audit. In fact, respondents to a 2003 U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO) survey cited quality of services offered and auditor reputation as 
the top two criteria in choosing an auditor.15 In addition, Datar and Alles (1999) demonstrate 
analytically that “auditor reputation facilitates better contracting between the firm and the 
manager”.  
                                                          
15
 A random sample of 250 companies from the 2003 Fortune 1000 were selected for the survey; all the 
respondents utilized a Big N auditor.  
10 
 
     Unfavorable news about an accounting firm’s audit quality could be perceived as a reputation 
damaging event. Studies examining such disclosures find that the clients of these audit firms exhibit 
a negative stock market reaction around the time of the event (Firth 1990; Weber et al. 2008; Dee et 
al. 2011). Negative disclosures regarding the quality of audits performed could also increase the 
likelihood of litigation against the auditor, particularly larger auditors who are viewed as having 
“deep pockets” and are often targets of litigation by shareholders if there is an audit failure (Dye 
1993; Lennox 1999). If the claims are large enough, they have the potential to affect the firm’s 
survival and the “insurance value for other clients’ future claims” (Krishnamurthy et al. 2006).16 In 
1990, Laventhol and Horwath, the seventh largest accounting firm in the U.S., filed for bankruptcy 
because of the significant amount of settled and pending litigation. This event removed the 
possibility of investors recovering claims from the auditor. Studies examining this occurrence find 
that the clients of this firm, particularly the financially distressed ones, had a negative stock market 
reaction to the bankruptcy announcement, providing evidence on the insurance value of an audit 
(Menon and Williams 1994; Baber et al. 1995). 
     Following the argument that unfavorable news about an accounting firm’s audit quality could 
reduce the perceived reputation of the auditor or the insurance value of audits, I test the following 
hypothesis stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1: Deloitte clients experienced a negative stock market reaction at the public release of 
Part II - Issues Related to Quality Control. 
     Prior research has also examined how aspects of the auditor or other auditing related activities 
affect perceptions of earnings quality or the informativeness of reported earnings, by examining 
investor reactions to earnings surprises using the earnings response coefficient (ERC).17 According 
to Teoh and Wong (1993), “so long as some auditors are perceived to follow policies that cause 
                                                          
16
 The reputation and insurance effects are discussed in detail in Weber et al. (2008) and have been the basis 
for numerous other studies including Dee et al. (2011), Menon and Williams (1994), and Baber et al. (1995). 
17
 See for example Teoh and Wong (1993); Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002); Francis and Ke (2006). 
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reported earnings to be more informative about value than other auditors, valuation theory predicts 
that the ERC will be different for different auditors. An auditor’s ‘quality’ can then be defined as 
the characteristic leading to greater informativeness of reported earnings.”  Studies utilizing the 
ERC find that Big N clients have higher ERC’s compared with non-Big N clients (Teoh and Wong 
1993); clients of auditors sanctioned by the SEC have lower ERC’s after the criticism was made 
public (Moreland 1995); and ERC’s are lower after auditor changes involving disagreements 
(Hackenbrack and Hogan 2002).18 
     If the sanction and the Part II disclosure caused investors to downgrade their perceptions of the 
audit quality provided by Deloitte, it could lead to a lower ERC for securities audited by Deloitte. 
Therefore I test the following hypotheses stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to other Big N clients, there is a decrease in perceived earnings quality for 
Deloitte clients after the PCAOB sanction. 
Hypothesis 3: Compared to other Big N clients, there is a decrease in perceived earnings quality for 
Deloitte clients after the public release of Part II – Issues Related to Quality Control. 
     If an unfavorable disclosure regarding an accounting firm’s audit quality is perceived as 
damaging the auditor’s reputation, then this could also lead to a decrease in market share and/or an 
increase in client dismissals for the firm because of concerns regarding the perceived credibility of 
their financial statements (Wilson and Grimlund 1990). For example, “in a 1983 SEC action 
involving Fox & Co. [a “second tier” audit firm], the Business Week [1984] story … focused 
heavily on the effects of a decline in the firm’s reputation. U.S. Minerals Exploration Co. recently 
dismissed Fox and went with Price Waterhouse. ‘We were very pleased with Fox’s service and fees, 
but Fox’s problems became our problems,’ says U.S. Mineral’s president. ‘Because of the SEC 
problem we started to get some flak from investment bankers’ (Wilson and Grimlund 1990; p 45)”. 
                                                          
18 A higher ERC indicates a higher perceived earnings quality signal. 
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Studies examining these types of events have found a decrease in market share and an increase in 
client dismissals after the negative disclosure (Firth 1990; Wilson and Grimlund 1990; Hillary and 
Lennox 2005; Weber et al. 2008). Furthermore, Dee et al. (2011) find a negative stock market 
reaction for Deloitte clients at the announcement of the sanction. They come to the conclusion that 
the sanction provided new information regarding Deloitte’s quality control procedures, providing 
further evidence that the event may have prompted concerns regarding the perceived credibility of 
financial statements audited by Deloitte. 
 Therefore I test the following hypothesis stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 4: Compared to other Big N clients, the likelihood of Deloitte’s clients changing 
auditors is higher after the PCAOB sanction. 
     Based on the majority consensus of prior research, I hypothesize that investors and clients will 
react to these two events and therefore, lead to a significant stock market reaction, a change in 
ERC’s, and an increase in client dismissals. It is possible, however, that there will be no observable 
reaction by investors or clients if they do not feel that the information released by the PCAOB was 
informative: either because of the content of the disclosures or the considerable lapse in time 
between when the issues occurred and when they were revealed to the public. There also could be 
no observable response if investors think the issues identified were isolated incidents not likely to 
affect the quality of engagements across the entire firm. Additionally, clients may believe that there 
are no quality issues with the service they receive from their local audit team and that the costs of 
switching outweigh any benefits. For example, Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002) do not find that 
ERC’s are different pre-to post-auditor switch for companies that provide either an uninformative 
reason or no reason for the auditor change. Additionally, Lennox and Pittman (2010) conclude that 
the PCAOB inspection reports are not informative because they do not find an association between 
the content of the reports and changes in audit firms’ market shares. Furthermore, Barton (2005) 
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document that 95% of Arthur Andersen clients wait to switch auditors until after the firm was 
indicted. This event was several months after accounting irregularities at Enron were revealed and 
the disclosure that Andersen had shredded audit evidence related to the Enron engagement. 
Therefore, it remains an empirical question as to whether there will be any observable reaction by 
























III. Stock Market Reaction to the public release of Part II 
Sample 
     I start with Audit Analytics and identify all clients of Big N auditors as of the event date 
(October 17, 2011). I eliminate firms that made earnings announcements or declared dividends 
within five trading days of the event date to remove confounding events that could impact the 
abnormal return (Menon and Williams 1994; Dee et al. 2011), and also require that companies have 
stock returns for the event window(s) and for at least 120 days during the estimation period. I also 
eliminate firms whose auditor is located outside the U.S., because the Part II disclosure reflects 
information on auditing issues uncovered at the U.S. Deloitte offices. The PCAOB has jurisdiction 
(although there are some limitations) to inspect the work of foreign auditors and separately reveal 
issues with their audit quality. I add them back to the sample as an additional test because Cahan et 
al. (2009) find that Arthur Andersen’s non U.S. clients that were cross-listed in the U.S. 
experienced a negative stock market reaction to important dates signaling trouble at the firm. I 
utilize CRSP for daily stock returns and shares outstanding, Compustat for accounting data, Audit 
Analytics for information on audit fees, opinions and internal control weaknesses and Thomson 
Reuters for institutional shareholder ownership. Table 1 provides the details of the sample selection. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Overall Market Reaction 
     I analyze the stock market reaction surrounding the announcement of the Part II disclosure 
following Schipper and Thompson (1983), a method frequently used in event studies.19 20  
I use the model in equation (1) with an estimation period of November 15, 2010 - November 14, 
2011. 
                                                          
19
 See for example Baber et al. (1995); Frischmann et al. (2008); Weber et al. (2008); and Dee et al. (2011). 
This method includes the event date and a short period after it in the estimation period. These studies also 
utilize the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) method which I use to examine the association between abnormal 
returns and company characteristics.  
20
 For comparative purposes to Dee et al. (2011), I also replicate the analysis of the first event – the PCAOB 





Rpt = α + βpRmt  + ∑δpkEventkt + εpt 
Rpt  =  equally weighted portfolio return for all clients of Deloitte (or all other Big N clients) on day t 
Rmt = market return on day t (proxied by CRSP value-weighted index) 
Eventkt = a dummy variable equal to one for the event window around the event date and zero for 
all other days in the estimation period 
     I perform a regression for the sample of Deloitte clients to examine if they experience a 
significant stock market reaction, and then a second test for the sample of other Big N clients. A 
negative and significant coefficient on “Event”, the event dummy variable, suggests that investors 
perceived the Part II disclosure as a negative event. The October 18, 2011 edition of The Wall Street 
Journal reports “wild swings in the past few weeks” and “poor liquidity and market turbulence 
which has seen the Dow [ Dow Jones Industrial Average] rise or fall by 1% or more in 14 of the 
past 19 trading days” (Lauricella and Zuckerman 2011).  Because of these market movements 
surrounding the event date, I examine event windows for both individual dates and a range of dates 
to more thoroughly examine the market reaction.  
[Insert Tables 2-4 about here] 
     Tables 2 - 4 report the results of the Schipper and Thompson (1983) regressions.21 There is no 
significant market reaction for any event window examined for the portfolio of either Deloitte 
clients or other Big N clients in Table 2. This is true for both the samples of U.S. clients (those 
whose auditor is located inside the U.S.) and U.S. and Non U.S. clients.22 Table 3 reports the same 
tests with returns winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. With this modification there is a negative 
market reaction for both samples of Deloitte clients (U.S. only and U.S. & Non U.S.) on Day (0). 
This result is significant at the 10% level, and there is no significant market reaction for other Big N 
clients on this day. Because this result is only present on one day, only at the 10% level and with 
                                                          
21
 The Breusch-Pagan test was performed and various plots were reviewed to determine if there was a 
heteroskedasticity problem. No adjustments were deemed necessary. 
22
 Auditor country is determined based on the country listed in the audit opinions module of Audit Analytics. 
16 
 
winsorized returns only, it is at best, very weak evidence that Deloitte clients experienced a 
negative market reaction to the public release of Part II. 
      Table 4 provides the results of an industry sector analysis using the 10 sectors from the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS); each sector is grouped into its own portfolio and a separate 
regression performed. There is no evidence of a negative market reaction that is prevalent among 
the entire Deloitte client base. Only four industries exhibit a negative and significant coefficient 
across the event windows; with only one sector (Industrials) significant on Day (0), the day that an 
overall significant negative reaction was previously identified. Similar results are found in the 
sample of other Big N clients and from untabulated results for an industry sector analysis using the 
sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients. Thus far, there is very limited evidence that the market is 
reacting to the first release of a Big N auditor’s Part II report. 
     I also examine the market reaction by calculating the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) using 
the standard market model methodology. I use the market model parameters of 250 trading days 
prior to the Part II disclosure date (excluding the 10 days before the announcement) and the CRSP 
value-weighted return (with dividends) to substitute for the market return. The abnormal return for 
firm i on day t (ARit) is the difference between the firm’s return and the estimated return; the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of the abnormal returns over the event window.  
[Insert Tables 5-7 about here] 
     Tables 5-7 report the results of the market model tests.23 If the market is reacting to the release of 
Deloitte’s Part II disclosure, then I expect for Deloitte clients to exhibit negative and significant 
CARs around the event windows and for these CARs to be significantly different (and lower) from 
the CARs exhibited by the control group of other Big N clients.  In Table 5 - Panel A, the mean and 
median CARs for Deloitte’s U.S. clients are negative and significant for Day (0); the median CAR 
for other Big N clients is also negative and significant for Day 0. However, the two groups (Deloitte 
                                                          
23
 For the test of differences in the mean (t-test) between the two groups, I first perform a variance ratio test to 
determine if the variances of the two groups are equal and then perform the corresponding appropriate t-test. 
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and other Big N) are not statistically different from each other; therefore one cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that they have the same means and medians. In other words, both groups have a negative 
abnormal return, but there is no evidence that Deloitte clients experienced a more significant market 
reaction (i.e. a more negative abnormal return) on Day (0), the date of the public release of Part II. 
On Day (1), both groups have positive CAR’s, which again are not significantly different from each 
other; thus providing no evidence that Deloitte clients experienced a less positive CAR compared to 
the other Big N group. The change in CAR’s from negative to positive appears to be attributable to 
general market movements. For example, the Dow fell 2.13% on October 17 (Day 0) and rose 1.6% 
on October 18 (Day 1).24 Furthermore, although Deloitte’s U.S. clients experienced a negative and 
significant market reaction for the event windows involving multiple days, there is no significant 
difference in the mean and median CARs between the two auditor groups.  
     Table 6 - Panel A reports the same tests as in Table 5, but with returns winsorized at the 1% and 
99% level. The primary difference in the winsorized analysis is that now there are more event 
windows that exhibit negative and significant CARs within each auditor group. However, the 
inferences from Table 5 still hold, there is no evidence of a statistically significant difference 
between the two auditor groups for the sample of U.S. only clients. Thus, although Deloitte’s U.S. 
clients experienced a negative market reaction in the event windows around the public release of 
Part II, there is no evidence that the market reaction was different from that of other Big N clients. 
Therefore, there is no indication that the market reaction of Deloitte clients for these days was in 
response to the release of Part II, which indicates that the market is not reacting to the first Part II 
Big N disclosure. 
     Next, I examine the market reaction for the sample that includes both U.S. and Non U.S. clients 
(Panel B of Tables 5 and 6). The individual t-tests for each auditor group for event windows (-1,+1), 
(0,+1) and (0,+2) indicate that Deloitte clients experienced a negative and significant market 
                                                          
24
 As reported in the 10/18 and 10/19/2011 editions of The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), respectively. The Dow 
also fell 0.6% on October 19 (Day 2), as reported in the 10/20/2011 edition of the WSJ. 
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reaction, while the group of other Big N clients did not have a significant market reaction (Table 5 - 
Panel B). The test of differences show that the mean CARs for these two auditor groups were 
different from each other at the 10% level, thus indicating that Deloitte clients experienced a more 
negative cumulative abnormal return than other Big N clients. However, this difference does not 
exist when examining the Median CARs. Panel B of Table 6 with the winsorized returns also 
reports differences in the Mean CARs between the two auditor groups for event windows of Day 
(0), (0,+1), and (0,+2). In all of these instances, it is the group of Deloitte clients that experienced 
the more negative return; however, once again the differences between the two groups no longer 
exist when examining the Median CARs. Consequently, these tests provide very limited evidence of 
Deloitte clients experiencing a negative market reaction to the public release of Part II. The most 
probable reason to expect a Non U.S. Deloitte client to react to unfavorable disclosures regarding 
auditing practices at Deloitte’s U.S. offices is the idea of the accounting firm having an 
international reputation (Cahan et al. 2009). I next examine which subset of international firms 
appears to be driving this result.  
     The differences in the Mean CARS between the two auditor groups reported  in Panel B of 
Tables 5 and 6 appear to be primarily driven by the sample of firms that have an auditor located in 
China (114 firms, 44 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu clients [hereafter referred to as “Deloitte China 
clients”] and 70 other Big N China clients), particularly within the Information Technology sector. 
In untabulated results, the two groups (Deloitte China clients and other Big N China clients) are 
significantly different from each other for the event windows of Day (0) and Day (0,+1) at the 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively (both unwinsorized and winsorized returns). In both event windows 
the Deloitte China clients experienced a more significant negative market reaction. There is no 
significant difference in the CARs between the two client groups for the sample of firms audited by 
foreign Big N auditors not in China. This provides limited evidence of an international reputation 
effect in response to the release of Part II; however, there have been restrictions on access to 
information for Chinese cross-listed companies as well as fraud uncovered at some of these 
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companies.25 These additional factors could explain in part why investors are more sensitive to this 
new information. 
     Panel C of Tables 5 and 6 report the results of the sign test (Cowan 1992). If the z-statistic is 
positive and significant it indicates that the group (Deloitte clients or other Big N clients) had a 
higher proportion of negative cumulative abnormal returns in the event window compared to the 
estimation period. Day (0) is the only event window that fits this criteria, but the sample of Other  
Big N clients also exhibits the same or stronger result. These results also provide no compelling 
evidence to support the notion of a negative market reaction for Deloitte clients at the release of 
Part II and thus, again support the prior assessment that there is limited evidence of the market 
reacting to the first Big N Part II disclosure. 
     Table 7 reports the results of the market model analysis by industry sector using the 10 sectors 
from the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). I report the analysis for the Day (0) and 
Day (0,+2) windows for U.S. only clients; however, inferences are the same for the other event 
windows. For Day (0) there are only two industries that are significantly different between the two 
auditor groups, and the difference does not exist in both the mean and median CARs. For Day 
(0,+2) there are also two significant industry differences (Consumer Staples and Utilities), with 
Deloitte clients experiencing the lower CARs in both industries. However, these two industries 
comprise only 11% of Deloitte’s public client portfolio. Thus, there is no evidence of a pervasive 
negative market reaction for Deloitte clients at the release of Part II. 
Multivariate Analysis 
     Next, I perform a multivariate analysis using the portfolio weighting approach of Sefcik and 
Thompson (1986), a method frequently used in event studies to account for cross-correlation in the 
                                                          
25
 The SEC requested audit documents for, Longtop Financial Technologies, Ltd, a Chinese cross-listed 
company, but has not been provided access to this information. These SEC requests were reported in May and 
September of 2011. Additionally, fraud at Chinese cross-listed companies was reported in a May 2011 article 
of the New York Times. 
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residuals because of event date clustering. In the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) approach, portfolio 
returns for Deloitte clients are determined based on company characteristics as follows: 
Rjt  =  W’p  Rit;    p = 1, 2, 3, …., P;     t = 1, 2, 3,…., T;     i = 1, 2, 3,…., N;     where: 
Rjt is a matrix of weighted portfolio returns for T trading days. 
Rit is the NxT matrix of daily stock returns.   
     The weights are determined by the following matrix: W = (X’X)-1X’, where X is a matrix 
composed of N rows and P columns. The number of columns (P) is equal to a column of 1’s, plus 
the number of company characteristics included in the analysis. The first column of the matrix X is 
composed of 1’s, while each of the P-1 remaining columns contain individual company values for 
the characteristics being examined. The number of rows (N) represents the number of companies in 
the sample.   
     I estimate (P) portfolio time-series regressions for each of the P-1 characteristics and the 
constant using portfolio weighted least squares as follows:26 
Equation (2) 























weighted portfolio return on day t (t = 1, 2,…253) for firm characteristic p 
(p = 1, 2,… 11). Day t represents a trading day from November 15, 2010 to 
November 14, 2011. Firm characteristic j represents one of the firm-specific 
characteristics (including the constant); 
 
market return on day t (t = 1, 2, …, 253), proxied by the CRSP value-
weighted index; 
 
an indicator variable for the public release of Part II - Issues Related to 
Quality Control, equal to one for the event window(s) and 0 otherwise; 
 
                                                          
26
 The estimation period is the same as for the Schipper and Thompson (1983) method –  
November 15, 2010 - November 14, 2011. 
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     The estimates of δj reflect the effect of the pth firm characteristic on the stock market reaction 
surrounding the event date. 
     For comparability to the market reaction analysis of the PCAOB sanction (Dee et al. 2011), I use 
the same firm characteristics expected to be associated with a reputation or insurance value effect.27 











































Zmijewski’s (1984) financial distress measure / Sinkey (1987)28; 
 
cumulative raw returns from November 15, 2010 to September 15, 2011; 
 
natural log of total assets (in million dollars); 
 
book value of equity divided by market value of equity; 
 
ratio of total debt to total assets; 
 
growth rate in sales; 
 
two-digit SIC code median adjusted ROA; 
 
equal to one if client received a going-concern explanatory paragraph 
opinion in the prior year; 
 
equal to one if auditor tenure is 3 years or less; 
 
percentage of institutional ownership, (number of shares owned by 
institutional investors / total shares outstanding); and 
 
t denotes days. 
 
     Company characteristics that are positively associated with auditor litigation are expected to be 
associated with a decrease in the insurance value of the audit and are, therefore, expected to be 
associated with a negative abnormal return. Company size, sales growth, leverage, ROA, financial 
distress, recent stock returns that are negative, and short auditor tenure are all expected to be 
                                                          
27 Dee et al. (2011) include two non-audit fee metrics based on the findings of Krishnamurthy et al. (2006) 
that Arthur Andersen clients with large non-audit fee metrics are associated with a negative stock market 
reaction, presumably because of concerns over auditor independence. The passage of SOX put significant 
restrictions on the non-audit services that could continue to be provided, therefore, the non-audit fee metrics 
are likely less relevant in this post-SOX study. For example, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) report that the mean of 
non-audit fees in a Big N pre-SOX sample was 49.6%, while Dee et al. (2011) report a value of 16.5% for 
their sample of Big N clients in 2007 and the metrics were not significant in the multivariate analysis. I 
therefore, choose to exclude these non-audit fee metrics from this study. 
28
 For financial companies I use a measure of financial distress from Sinkey et al. (1987). 
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positively associated with auditor litigation (Lys and Watts 1994; Shu 2000; Stice 1991; Menon and 
Williams 1994; and St. Pierre and Anderson 1984). There has been mixed evidence on the 
association of qualified opinions and auditor litigation. Shu (2000) find a positive association, while 
other studies have found it to be either not significantly associated with auditor litigation or 
sensitive to model specifications (Lys and Watts 1994; Carcello and Palmrose 1994). 
     However, some of these factors are also associated with lower financial statement quality or 
incentives to manage earnings. These types of conditions may cause investors’ to be more sensitive 
to disclosures regarding auditor reputation because of concerns over the credibility of the financial 
statements.  These factors include financial distress, high leverage, high sales growth, and short 
auditor tenure, which are expected to be positively related to incentives or opportunities to manage 
earnings. Additionally, low ROA and lower book-to-market ratios are expected to be negatively 
related to incentives/opportunities to manage earnings (Dee et al. 2011). Institutional ownership is 
included as a measure of corporate governance because companies with less monitoring may have 
more incentives to manage earnings. Also, institutional owners tend to be more sophisticated and 
may process information differently.29 Companies with factors that are associated with an incentive 
to manage earnings are expected to be more sensitive to a decline in auditor reputation and therefore 
are expected to be associated with a negative abnormal return. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
     Table 8 - Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the sample of firms that have all the necessary 
information to calculate the variables of interest in the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) regressions.     
Table 8 - Panel B reports the results of the Sefcik and Thompson regressions for the event windows 
of Day (0) and Day (0,+2) for the sample of Deloitte clients. Although the two auditor groups did 
not experience a return that was significantly different from each other, Deloitte clients did 
experience a significantly negative market reaction for these two event windows (Table 5). For the 
                                                          
29 For example, Menon and Williams (2010) find that the negative market reaction to the disclosure of a 
going-concern opinion is driven by high institutional ownership. 
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sample of U.S. only clients, this negative abnormal return is more prevalent in companies with 
higher institutional ownership and those that are less financially distressed. This result is opposite to 
what was predicted earlier and also contrasts with prior studies (Dee et al. 2011 and Weber et al. 
2008).  One possible explanation for the institutional ownership finding is that institutional owners 
are typically more sophisticated investors and therefore, may have been more aware of the release 
of this report and processed the information differently than the average investor.  
     For the sample of U.S. and non U.S. clients, this negative abnormal return is more prevalent in 
companies with lower stock returns in the period before the event. This finding is consistent with 
the earlier prediction and with the findings of Menon and Williams 1994. Untabulated results for 
the other Big N clients sample reveal that the negative stock market reaction is more predominant 
for companies with lower institutional ownership for the event window of Day (0), but only in the 
full sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients. 
    I also examine the association between abnormal returns and two additional factors: highly 
litigated industries [those with SIC codes of 2833-2836 and 8731-8734 (biotechnology), 3570-3577 
and 7370-7374 (computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), and 5200-5961 (retailing) (Francis et al. 
1994)] and the presence of at least one internal control material weakness identified in the most 
recent auditor’s report. Investors in companies with these characteristics could be more sensitive to 
unfavorable news that potentially affects the insurance value of the audit or the reputation of the 
auditor due to concerns of increased litigation or a greater need for confidence in the financial 
statements when prior weaknesses have been revealed. For these tests, I use the subset of companies 
that comply with SOX 404b (the auditor reports on management’s assessment of internal controls). 
In untabulated results, I do not find that the presence of a material weakness in the auditor’s 404 
report is significant in explaining the negative market reaction for Deloitte clients; however, in the 
sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients I find that the negative market reaction is more prevalent for 
companies in highly litigated industries. I do not find that either of these two characteristics are 




     The multivariate analysis revealed that financial distress and institutional ownership were 
significant in explaining the returns for Deloitte’s U.S. clients around the release of Part II. 
Therefore, I re-perform the market model analysis for the U.S. only clients using the sample from 
the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) analysis. I divide both auditor groups at their own median for two 
independent tests using observations either below or above the median. In untabulated results, I find 
no evidence that Deloitte clients experienced a more negative (less positive) reaction than the group 
of other Big N clients for any of these tests. When there were any significant differences between 
the two groups it was because the other Big N clients experienced the more negative (less positive) 
reaction. Next, I perform market model tests with subsamples of NYSE listed firms (55% of the 
sample), NASDAQ listed firms (38%), and all firms that are not listed on the NYSE (45%).  
Despite the fact that Deloitte clients in these subsets experienced a negative and significant market 
reaction around the event windows, there is no statistical difference in the mean or median CAR’s 
of the two auditor groups. Thus, these (untabulated) tests also provide no evidence of Deloitte’s 














IV. Perceived Earnings Quality – Earnings Response Coefficient 
Sample 
     Using a sample of quarterly earnings announcements made by Big N clients, I compare ERC’s in 
a pre-period to ERC’s in a post-period (for each event separately). 30  Following Nelson et al. (2008) 
the post-period starts with earnings announcements one day after the event date and the pre-period 
on this same date one year earlier. I exclude firms that switched auditors between the pre-and post-
periods. I utilize Compustat for financial information, CRSP for stock prices, Audit Analytics for 
auditor identity and internal control weaknesses and I/B/E/S for earnings announcements. I perform 
analyses based on auditor location, using samples of U.S. only clients and then later samples of U.S. 
and Non U.S. clients. The selection of quarters to test was based on a review of which quarterly 
announcements were occurring immediately following the event date, refer to information below 
for further details. 
Event 1- Sanction on 12/10/2007    
Pre-Sanction Post-Sanction 
Start date of 
announcements  12/11/2006  12/11/2007 
Test (1) 4Q announcements for November - January fiscal year-ends 
Test (2) 
Companies from Test (1) that made earnings announcement 






                                                          
30
 Prior research has used both annual and quarterly earnings announcements to examine ERC’s for research 
questions associated with auditor and audit related characteristics. See for example Teoh and Wong (1993); 
Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002); Krishnan et al. (2005); and Francis and Ke (2006). 
31
 Bronson et al. (2011) report that the mean annual earnings announcement lag (time between the fiscal year-
end and the earnings announcement) is between 42 and 47 days. If companies are providing earnings 
information in excess of this time frame, investors’ sensitivities to these earnings announcements may differ 
compared to ones that are issued on a more timely basis.  
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Event 2- Public Release of Part II - Issues Related to Quality Controls on 10/17/2011 







ments  10/18/2010  10/18/2011 
Test (1) 
3Q announcements for December and January fiscal year-ends and 4Q 
announcements for September – November fiscal year-ends 
Test (2) 




       I utilize the following OLS regression (consistent with Francis and Ke 2006 and Krishnan et al. 
2005) for the sample of earnings announcements in the pre-and post-event windows as described 
above.  
Equation (3) 
CARit =  βo + β1UEit + β2POST +  β3Dit+ β4Dit*POST + β5UEit *Dit + β6UEit*POST  + 
β7UEit*Dit*POST + β8UEit*MBit + β9UEit *STDRETit * + β10UEit*LEVERAGEit + β11UEit*LOSSit + 
β12UEit* RESTit + β13UEit*MVEit +  β14UEit*ABSUEit  + β15UEit*EXPERTit  +   β16UEit*404bit    +   



































cumulative abnormal return in the (-1, +1) window surrounding the 
quarterly earnings announcement; 
 
the firm’s quarterly earnings surprise; defined as the actual 
quarterly earnings per share minus the most recent median 
consensus analyst forecast, scaled by stock price at the beginning 
of the quarter; 
 
equal to one if observation is in the post-sanction (post-Part II 
quality control disclosure) period and 0 otherwise; 
 
equal to one if the firm is audited by Deloitte and 0 otherwise; 
 
























































equal to one if the auditor has the largest market share (audit fees) 
in the industry (2 digit SIC code) and 0 otherwise; 
 
the ratio of market value to book value of equity; 
 
the standard deviation of daily stock returns over a 90-day window 
ending 7 days prior to the earnings announcement date; 
 
the ratio of total debt to total assets; 
 
natural log of market value of common equity at the beginning of 
the quarter (in million dollars); 
 
equal to one if the current quarter’s earnings are negative and 0 
otherwise; 
 
equal to one if the special item as a percentage of total assets in the 
quarter is less than or equal to -5% and 0 otherwise; 
 
the absolute value of UE; 
 
equal to one if the firm complies with 404b and 0 otherwise; 
 
set of industry indicatory variables (Fama-French 12); 
 
i denotes client firm; and 
 
t denotes year. 
 
 
     The dependent variable is the three day cumulative abnormal return (-1, +1) around the quarterly 
earnings announcement. It is calculated using the market model parameters of 200 trading days 
prior to the earnings announcement date (excluding the 5 days before the announcement) and the  
CRSP value-weighted return to substitute for the market return. Consistent with prior research, I 
control for other determinants of the ERC: growth opportunities (proxied by the ratio of market 
value to book value of equity), risk (the standard deviation of daily stock returns and leverage), 
earnings persistence (loss and restructure), size (natural log of the market value of equity) 
nonlinearity in the ERC (absolute value of unexpected earnings), if the auditor is an industry expert, 
if the client complies with SOX 404(b) (Francis and Ke 2006; Krishnan et al. 2005; Singer and You 
28 
 
2011) and industry dummies. 32 All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels 
and standard errors are clustered by company. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
     The model is structured to enable comparisons between the two groups (Deloitte and other Big N 
firms) in both the pre-and-post time periods, and to compare the groups against themselves across 
the two time periods. The table below shows the coefficients of interest necessary for these 
comparisons. The coefficient on β7 represents the difference between the two groups across the two 
time periods. This provides a more complete analysis by allowing for any possible differences in 
ERC’s between Deloitte clients and other Big N clients that may exist in the pre-event period. A 
negative and significant coefficient on β7 supports H2 (and H3) that compared to other Big N 
clients, there is a decrease in perceived earnings quality for Deloitte clients after the PCAOB 
sanction (after the public release of Part II – Issues Related to Quality Control). 
β 5 Compare Deloitte to other Big N in the pre-period 
β5 + β7 Compare Deloitte to other Big N in the post-period 
β6 + β7 Compare Deloitte to itself pre vs. post period  
β6 Compare other Big N to itself pre vs. post period 
β7 Comparison of Deloitte pre-to-post vs. other Big N pre-to-post 
 
Descriptive Information and Descriptive Statistics 
[Insert Table10 about here] 
     Table 10 reports descriptive information during the sample period for each of the two events. 
The two groups (Deloitte and Other Big N) are primarily not different from each other in terms of 
the control variables. There are a few characteristics in each of the two event periods where the  
auditor groups have some differences (market-to-book ratio, leverage, restructuring, and the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns). However, these variables are generally not significant in 
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the regression analyses in Tables 11-14. In addition, the two groups are not different from each 
other in terms of their CARS or their unexpected earnings. 
Results from Regression – Equation (3) 
[Insert Tables 11-14 about here] 
     Tables 11-14 report the results of the regression analyses for equation (3). The analysis on each 
table consists of six columns. The first specification includes all quarterly earnings announcements 
for the quarters selected for testing. The second specification includes only earnings announcements 
that occurred within 45 days of the quarter-end date. In the third specification, I also drop all 
companies from SIC code 6000-6999 because the operating environment and accounting 
classifications are different for this financial services industry sector. I perform each of these three 
tests for both auditor location samples: U.S. only clients and U.S. and Non U.S. clients. 
     Tables 11 and 12 report the results of the analysis for the PCAOB sanction. Table 11 reports 
results using CARs for a (-1,+1) window as the dependent variable and Table 12 utilizes CARs for a 
(-2,+2) window. The coefficient on the UE*D variable is not significant in any specification, 
indicating that there was no difference in the perceived earnings quality of Deloitte clients 
compared to other Big N clients in the year before the PCAOB sanction was made public. The 
variable of primary interest is the three-way interaction term of UE*D*POST. It is a difference in 
differences comparison because it is a comparison across auditor groups (Deloitte and other Big N) 
and time periods (pre and post-sanction). In Table 11 the coefficient of interest on the three-way 
interaction term is not significant in any of the six specifications. In Table 12, this variable is 
negative and significant at the 10% level for the first specification; all earnings announcements for 
the sample of U.S. only clients. This implies that there was a decrease in the perceived earnings 
quality for Deloitte clients after the PCAOB sanction, after controlling for differences across time. 
However, this result does not hold in the second and third specifications, when examining only 
earnings announcements issued within 45 days of the quarter-end date and also when dropping 
companies within the financial services sector. 
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     Tables 13 and 14 report the results of the analysis for the release of Part II - Issues Related to 
Quality Control. As before, Table 13 reports results using CARs for a (-1,+1) window as the 
dependent variable and  Table 14 utilizes CARs for a (-2,+2) window. The coefficient on the UE*D 
variable is not significant in any specification, indicating that there was no difference in the 
perceived earnings quality of Deloitte clients compared to other Big N clients in the year before the 
Part II report was made public. In addition, the coefficient of interest on the three-way interaction 
term, UE*D*POST, is also not significant in any of the six specifications on either table. This 
indicates that there was no decrease in the perceived earnings quality for Deloitte clients after the 
public release of Part II. In general, the control variables across the four tables that are significant 
are UE*LOSS, UE*REST, UE*ABSUE and UE*404b and they are significant in the expected 
direction based on prior literature (Francis and Ke 2006; Krishnan et al. 2005; Singer and You 
2011). 
Additional Tests 
     First, I replace the UE * 404b variable with the following variable: UE*MW, where MW is 
defined as a one if the most recent auditor’s report (404 b) discloses at least one material weakness. 
Singer and You (2011) find that investors perceive earnings quality to be higher at companies that 
comply with 404(b). It is also possible that investors react to earnings surprises differently for 
companies that disclose internal control material weaknesses. In untabulated results, I find no 
significant coefficients on the primary variable of interest, UE*D*POST, for any of the 
specifications tested in the prior tables. Next, I interact the UE variable with a short tenure indicator 
where tenure is equal to one if the auditor tenure is three years or less (UE*TENURE) to allow for 
the possibility of auditor tenure affecting the perceived credibility of earnings. Again, I find that 
there is no statistical significance for the coefficient on the variable of primary interest 
(UE*D*POST) with the inclusion of this additional variable. I also perform additional tests for the 
subset of clients operating in highly litigated industries. In the prior tests I generally did not find 
that there was a decrease in the perceived earnings quality for Deloitte clients after these two 
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events. I partition the sample based on highly litigated industries33 because if there are concerns 
over shareholder litigation, then individuals/organizations with holdings in companies operating in 
these industries may be more sensitive to financial information audited by an accounting firm 
whose reputation is perceived less favorably than other peer auditors. In untabulated results, I find 
no significant coefficients on the primary variable of interest, UE*D*POST, for any of the 
specifications tested in the prior tables for either the sample of companies in highly litigated 
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 The SIC codes used in the highly litigated specification are the same as the ones in the market reaction test 
in Section III. 
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V. Auditor Change/Client Dismissal Analysis – PCAOB Sanction 
Sample 
     I use a sample of Big N clients (as identified by Audit Analytics) with data for the period of 
2004 through 2009 to identify Big N auditor switches that occurred from 2005 through 2009 (the 
test period).  I eliminate companies that have nonconsecutive years or that appear only once in the 
sample because I am not able to accurately assess if an auditor change occurred (refer to Table 15 
for details on the sample). I utilize Audit Analytics for audit related information such as audit 
opinions, and internal control weaknesses; Compustat for financial information; Thomson Reuters 
for institutional ownership and CRSP for shares outstanding. The sample period is 2005 through 
2009; however, I use data for the years 2004 through 2011, for lag and lead information for the 
control variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
[Insert Table 15 about here] 
     I begin the analysis with 2005 because it is several years after the demise of Arthur Andersen 
and the passage of SOX, events which prompted many auditor changes (Landsman et al. 2009; 
Hogan and Martin 2009). Based on a review of when auditor dismissals occurred and what fiscal 
years they relate to, the pre-period is defined as January 2005 – March 2008 and the post-period is 
defined as April 2008 – December 2009.34 These cut-offs allow most companies to appear three 
times in the pre-period and two times in the post-period.35  
     I perform analyses with categories based on client fiscal year-ends (all fiscal year-ends or 
December year-ends only), the nature of the switching decision (all auditor changes or client 
dismissals only) and auditor location (U.S. only clients or U.S. and Non U.S. clients). The tests with 
U.S. clients and auditor switches involving only client dismissals are the primary analysis. The 
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 I also require that observations with auditor dismissal dates after 12/10/2007 are included in the post-period 
because the decision to change auditors was made after the sanction was made public. Similarly, I also  
require that observations with dismissal dates on or before 12/10/2007 are included in the pre-period. Auditor 
dismissal dates are available for 90% of all auditor changes. 
35 Prior research examining auditor switches in connection with a negative reputation event have used five 
year periods. See for example Weber et al. (2008) and Skinner and Srinivasan (2012). 
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PCAOB sanction revealed information regarding the quality of audit work performed by Deloitte’s 
U.S. offices. Thus, I expect the strongest result to be in the sample of U.S. clients; however, there is 
also the idea of the accounting firm having an international reputation. Therefore, I also perform 
separate analyses with the sample of both U.S. and Non U.S. clients. In addition, I am interested in 
client perceptions of audit quality. If the sanction is perceived as a negative event, then I would 
expect an increase in client dismissals, rather than auditor resignations or a decline by the auditor to 
stand for re-election.36 Lopez and Peters (2011) find that auditor switching is less likely to occur for 
December year-end clients, thus, I separately analyze this group. In addition, using a sample of only 
December year-ends holds constant the point in time in the fiscal year during which the PCAOB 
sanction was made public. I also examine whether the subset of clients operating in highly litigated 
industries are more likely to change auditors after this negative disclosure. It is possible that clients 
operating in a litigious environment are more sensitive to unfavorable news about their accounting 
firm’s audit quality. 
     I utilize the logistic regression model in equation (4) with control variables that reflect various 
company factors, client misalignment and other elements predicted to influence the auditor switch 
decision. 
Equation (4) 
SWITCHit = βo + β1Dit-1 + β2POST + β3D it-1*POST + β4GROWTHit-1 + β5ABSDACCit-1 + 
β6INVRECit-1 + β7ROAit-1 + β8LOSSit-1 + β9SIZEit-1+ β10M&Ait-1 +  β11MISMATCHit-1+  
β12NEG_OPINIONit-1 + β13ICWEAKit-1 +  β14TENUREit-1 + β15EXPERTit-1+ β16INSTit-1 + 
















equal to one if a change in the company’s audit firm (from year t-1 to t) 
and 0 otherwise; 
 
equal to one if Deloitte is the prior year auditor and 0 otherwise; 
 
equal to one if fiscal year-end is from 4/30/2008 – 12/31/2009 and 0 
otherwise; 
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equal to one if Deloitte is the prior year auditor and POST  
is equal to one and 0 otherwise; 
 
(total assets – beginning total assets) / beginning total assets; 
 
absolute value of discretionary total accruals; 
 
(inventory + receivables) / total assets; 
 
return on assets, defined as (net income before extraordinary items) / 
(average total assets); 
 
equal to one if ROA < 0, and 0 otherwise; 
 
natural log of market value of equity (in million dollars); 
 
equal to one if the client had a merger or acquisition in the two most 
recent years, (from SALE footnote = AA in the 2 most recent years); 
 
equal to one if the company is mismatched with the auditor, and 0 
otherwise, following the methodology in Shu (2000); 
 
equal to one if the audit opinion is a going-concern, qualified or adverse 
opinion, and 0 otherwise; 
 
equal to one if the auditor’s report on internal control over financial 
reporting discloses at least one material weakness, and 0 otherwise; 
 
equal to one if auditor tenure is three years or less and 0 otherwise; 
 
equal to one if the auditor has the largest market share (audit fees) in 
the industry (2 digit SIC code) and 0 otherwise; 
 
percentage of institutional ownership, (number of shares owned by 
institutional investors / total shares outstanding); 
 
proceeds of long-term debt and common and preferred stock issuances 
(for two fiscal years after the year of the new auditor’s initial 
engagement), scaled by total assets in the year preceding the auditor 
change; 
 
the difference between the year and 2005; 
 
 
set of industry indicator variables (Fama-French 12); 
 
i denotes client firm; and 
 





     As with the ERC analysis, the model is structured to enable several comparisons between the 
two auditor groups across time. A positive and significant coefficient on β3 supports H4, that 
Deloitte clients are more likely to switch auditors after the PCAOB sanction, after controlling for 
differences across time. 
β 1 Compare Deloitte to other Big N in the pre-period 
β 1 + β3 Compare Deloitte to other Big N in the post-period 
β 2 + β3 Compare Deloitte to itself pre vs. post period  
β 2 Compare other Big N to itself pre vs. post period 
β 3 Comparison of Deloitte pre-to-post vs. other Big N pre-to-post 
 
     Following Landsman et al. (2009) and Lopez and Peters (2011), I control for company factors 
expected to be associated with the likelihood of switching auditors. Companies with short tenure or 
negative audit opinions are expected to be more likely to switch auditors (Landsman et al. 2009; 
Chow and Rice 1982). Clients who are mismatched with their auditor are expected to have a higher 
likelihood of switching. The mismatch variable is based on Shu (2000). Clients that utilize an 
industry expert are expected to have less likelihood of switching auditors (Landsman et al. 2009). 
An audit firm is defined as the national industry specialist if in a particular year the auditor has the 
largest market share in a two-digit SIC category.   
     I also control for size, which is expected to have a negative relation with the auditor switch 
decision because the costs of switching auditors is expected to be greater for larger clients 
(DeAngelo 1981). The company’s growth rate, levels of receivables and accruals, recent mergers 
and acquisitions, and the presence of weak internal controls are all expected to be positively 
associated with the likelihood of an auditor switch. More profitable companies are expected to have 
a negative association with the likelihood of an auditor switch, therefore LOSS is expected to be 
positively associated and ROA negatively associated with the likelihood of switching auditors 
(Landsman et al 2009; Lopez and Peters 2011). Prior research has also included measures of agency 
costs which are expected to influence the auditor switch decision. Following Barton (2005), I 
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include the percentage of institutional ownership; greater levels of institutional ownership may 
induce more monitoring of management and lead to switches away from auditors who are perceived 
as having a less credible reputation. Consistent with DeFond (1992) and Francis and Wilson (1988), 
I also include a measure for the debt and equity proceeds issued subsequent to the auditor change. A 
company planning to issue new financing in the near future may have an incentive to switch to an 
auditor perceived to have a better reputation in order to lend more credibility to their financial 
information. Lastly, I include a time trend variable and industry dummies (Fama-French 12). 
Descriptive Information and Descriptive Statistics 
[Insert Tables 16-17 about here] 
     Table 16 reports descriptive information for auditor market share, auditor changes, and client 
gains during the sample period. In order to provide a more complete picture of the market share and 
activity within each Big N firm, I report the auditor information in Table 16 before dropping 
companies that have missing financial information or that only appear one year in the sample 
period.  The market share for each Big N auditor is consistent over time and is split fairly evenly 
among the four groups, ranging between 19 and 32%; with Ernst & Young on the higher end and 
KPMG on the lower end. During the pre-sanction period, Deloitte’s auditor changes were 
comparable or lower to the other Big N firms. However, in the post period, particularly in 2009, 
Deloitte experienced a slightly higher percentage of the auditor changes and the lowest or second 
lowest client gains. Table 17 reports the industry portfolio composition of each Big N firm for the 
sample of clients whose auditors are in the U.S. and have December year-ends.37 Panel A reveals 
that each Big N firm generally has a similar percentage of clients within each industry in its 
portfolio. The main exception is the Healthcare industry in which Ernst & Young has 23% of its 
client portfolio and nearly double or triple the amount of clients as the other three firms. Panel B 
provides the client dismissals by industry and Panel C provides the auditor resignations/decline to 
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 I report information for the subset of December year-end clients in Tables 17 and 18 because this is where I 
focus most of my later tests. 
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stand for re-election by industry. Business equipment, Healthcare, Finance, and Other represent 
approximately 60% of the total client dismissals and 75% of the auditor resignations/decline to 
stand for re-election during the sample period. The logistic regression includes controls for 
industries to account for the fact that some industries have slightly higher switch rates. However, 
the information provided in Table 17 provides no evidence that the industries are unduly balanced 
among the Big N firms. 
[Insert Table 18 about here] 
     Table 18 provides descriptive statistics for the December year-end clients that dismissed their 
auditor. I present descriptive statistics for this sample because the focus of my study is to examine if 
there is an increase in the likelihood of client dismissals after the PCAOB sanction. I present 
information for December year-end companies because I focus most of my later tests on this subset. 
Prior literature has established that certain characteristics are more likely to affect the auditor switch 
decision. Table 18 reveals that the clients who dismissed Deloitte are predominantly the same as the 
clients who dismissed other Big N auditors in terms of the control variables. The only significant 
differences are in the categories of auditor tenure and auditor expertise. I perform additional 
analyses with these traits in a later section.  
Results of Logistic Regression 
[Insert Tables 19-20 about here] 
     Tables 19 -22 report the results of the logistic regression analyses. In general, the analysis on 
each table consists of six columns. The first three columns represent the sample of U.S. only clients; 
while the last three represent the combined sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients. The first 
specification includes all auditor changes (both client dismissals and auditor resignations). The 
second specification is the primary test, dropping the auditor resignations, and therefore only 
examining auditor switches that occurred due to client dismissals.  In the third specification I drop 
all companies from SIC code 6000-6999 because the operating environment and accounting 
classifications are different for this financial services industry sector. 
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     Table 19 reports the results of the analysis on December year-end clients. The coefficient on D is 
not significant, indicating that the two auditor groups (Deloitte and other Big N) are not statistically 
different from each other in the pre-sanction period in terms of the likelihood of losing clients. The 
coefficient on POST is also not significant, indicating that the group of other Big N clients had no 
change in the likelihood of switching auditors between the pre and post-sanction period. The 
significance for the combined coefficient of POST and D*POST ranges from the 1% to the 10% 
levels indicating that compared to the pre-sanction period, Deloitte clients are more likely to change 
auditors after the PCAOB sanction was made public. The significance for the combined coefficient 
of D and D*POST is at the 5% and 10% levels indicating that compared to other Big N clients, 
Deloitte clients are more likely to change auditors in the post-sanction period. This result reflects a 
comparison across the two auditor groups during one time period (after the PCAOB sanction was 
made public). However, the coefficient on TREND is negative and significant at the 1%  level, 
indicating that the likelihood of auditor switches among all Big N clients is decreasing during the 
sample period. Thus, there is also a difference in switching behavior between the two time periods. 
The variable of primary interest, D*POST, is a difference in differences comparison because it is a 
comparison across auditor groups (Deloitte and other Big N) and time periods (pre and post-
sanction).  
     This interaction variable has the predicted positive sign, indicating that Deloitte clients are more 
likely to switch auditors after the sanction, after controlling for differences across time. The results 
are weaker in the U.S. only sample; the group that is most likely to be affected by the information in 
the PCAOB sanction report. In the U.S. sample, the D*POST variable is significant at the 10% 
level; while in the sample of both U.S. and Non U.S. clients, the variable of interest is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. Untabulated results reveal that the odds ratio for the coefficient of 
interest is 1.569, 1.534, 1.592, 1.541, 1.675, and 1.772, respectively, for each of the six models 
presented in Table 19. Recall from the earlier explanation of coefficients that the interaction 
coefficient, D*POST, represents the difference across both time and auditor groups. Thus, for the 
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U.S. only sample, the odds of Deloitte clients changing auditors after the PCOAB sanction are 50% 
higher than the odds of other Big N clients changing auditors, after controlling for differences 
across time. Untabulated results reveal that the probability of Deloitte being dismissed in the post-
sanction period is 4.96%, while the probability of other Big N clients dismissing their auditors in 
the post-sanction time period is 3.29% (for samples of U.S. only clients).38  
     The results on the control variables of SIZE, MISMATCH, NEG_OPINION, ICWEAK, 
NEWFINC, and ABSDACC are in the expected direction. The coefficients on TENURE in the U.S. 
clients sample are negative and significant at the 1% level. This is opposite of what was predicted, 
but consistent with the results reported in Lopez and Peters (2011) which is a Big N auditor 
switching study using date from 2004 – 2007. This result indicates that U.S. clients with short 
tenure are less likely to switch auditors.  
     Table 20 reports the results of the analysis for all fiscal year-end clients. The variable of interest, 
D*POST, is only significant in the sample of both U.S. and Non U.S. clients and only at the 10% 
level. The results on the control variables are similar to what was reported in Table 19, with a few 
additional variables now significant and in the same directions as predicted (INVREC, LOSS, SIZE, 
MISMATCH, NEG_OPINION, ICWEAK and NEWFINC).   
[Insert Table 21 about here] 
Additional Tests  
     It is possible that the information in the PCAOB sanction could be perceived differently by 
subsets of clients with distinct characteristics, even if on average the entire Deloitte client base did 
not react. I perform additional analyses splitting the sample based on the following characteristics: 
the client is operating in a highly litigated industry, the client has short auditor tenure, and the client 
engages an industry expert auditor.  I partition the sample based on highly litigated industries 
because if there are concerns over shareholder litigation, then clients operating in these industries 
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may be more sensitive to utilizing an auditor whose reputation is perceived less favorably than other 
peer auditors. I use samples of tenure and expertise for two reasons. First, these attributes were 
significant in explaining the likelihood of auditor switching, particularly within the sample of U.S. 
clients, and second, there are significant differences in these characteristics between the two auditor 
groups (Table 18). For each characteristic, I perform two independent regressions, one for 
companies possessing this trait and then a second analysis for those that do not have this trait.      
     Table 21 reports results for the subset of clients with December year-ends operating in highly 
litigated industries.39 The coefficient of interest, D*POST is positive and significant at the 5% level 
in the sample of U.S. clients and positive and significant at the 1% level in the sample of all clients. 
Therefore, these results indicate that Deloitte clients operating in highly litigated industries are more 
likely to switch auditors after the PCAOB sanction. There was no significance on the coefficient of 
interest for the subset of clients not operating in highly litigated industries; thus, it appears that 
clients in litigated industries were more sensitive to the news of the PCAOB sanction compared 
with how the entire Deloitte client base reacted. Untabulated results reveal that the odds ratio for the 
coefficient of interest is 2.742, 2.807, 2.652, and 3.136, respectively, for each of the four models 
presented in Table 21. Thus, for the U.S. only sample, the odds of Deloitte clients changing auditors 
after the PCOAB sanction are 170% and 180% higher than the odds of other Big N clients changing 
auditors, after controlling for differences across time (significant at the 5% level). Untabulated 
results reveal that the probability of Deloitte being dismissed in the post-sanction period is 9.02% if 
the client operates in highly litigated industries, while the probability for other Big N auditors is 
3.79% (sample of U.S. clients).40  
     There are some differences in the variables used in these regressions versus those reported in 
Tables 19 and 20. First, industry controls were not used because the SIC codes maintained for this 
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 The SIC codes used in the highly litigated specification are the same as the ones in the market reaction test 
in Section III. 
40
 Untabulated results reveal that there is no difference in means between the two auditor groups (Deloitte and 
other Big N) for companies that dismiss their auditors and are in highly litigated industries. 
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sample of clients is a very small subset. Second, eight other control variables were not used in this 
regression (INVREC, ROA, LOSS, MISMATCH, NEG_OPINION, EXPERT INST, and 
NEWFINC) because the sample sizes in these tests are considerably smaller than those used in the 
full samples reported in Tables 19 and 20. In logistic regression models there is a general guideline 
that there should be ten outcomes of each type (auditor switches or no auditor switches) for each 
predictor (each independent variable), otherwise coefficient estimates could be biased and standard 
errors not as precise (Agresti p. 138). Due to the number of auditor changes (122 in the smallest 
sample) I can only run an accurate analysis with eleven independent variables (the intercept adds 
the twelfth variable). Therefore, I perform a stepwise regression and eliminate the variables that this 
procedure determines are least significant in explaining auditor switches. I also perform a factor 
analysis and the results for the coefficient of interest are the same sign and significance; thus, these 
results are robust to alternate specifications and the inclusion of fewer variables. 
     Untabulated results for the sample of all fiscal year-end highly litigated clients reveal weaker 
results in both auditor location groups. For the subset of client dismissals (equivalent to 
specification 2 and 4 in Table 21), the coefficient of interest is positive and significant, but only at 
the 10% level for the sample of U.S. clients and at the 5% level for the sample of U.S. and Non U.S. 
clients. 
[Insert Table 22 about here] 
     The next analysis partitions the sample based on auditor tenure. The prior analyses indicated that 
U.S. clients with short tenure are less likely to switch auditors; stated another way, clients with 
tenure greater than three years are the group that is more likely to change auditors. This makes 
sense because switching auditors frequently can be costly in terms of the loss of information and 
client specific knowledge when a new auditor is engaged. For this group of clients with tenure 
greater than three years, the coefficient of interest, D*POST is positive and significant at the 5% 
level in the sample of U.S. clients with December year-ends, and positive and significant at the 1% 
and 5%  levels in the sample of all clients. These results indicate that clients who have engaged 
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Deloitte for more than three years are more likely to switch auditors after the PCAOB sanction. 
Untabulated odds ratios reveal that the odds of Deloitte being dismissed after the PCOAB sanction 
are 107%  higher than the odds of other Big N auditors being dismissed, after controlling for 
differences across time (significant at the 5% level; sample of U.S. clients). Furthermore, the  
probability of Deloitte being dismissed in the post-sanction period is 5.3% if the client has engaged 
Deloitte greater than three years, while the probability for other Big N auditors is 3.39% (sample of 
U.S. clients). There was no significance on the coefficient of interest (D*POST) for the subset of 
clients with short tenure (i.e. tenure of three years or less); thus, it appears that clients in certain 
tenure groups were more sensitive to the news of the PCAOB sanction compared with how the 
entire Deloitte client base reacted. Although prior research finds support for the idea that investors 
view long auditor tenure as enhancing earnings quality (Ghosh and Moon 2005), it is possible that 
this could be counteracted when unfavorable news regarding the quality of the accounting firm is 
revealed. In addition, concerns have been expressed from time to time that long tenure may 
compromise auditor independence and objectivity (PCAOB 2011). Upon further analysis, 38% of 
the Deloitte post-sanction client dismissals were by clients with tenure of more than ten years. From 
time to time, clients do put the audit up for competitive bids, so it is possible that this new 
information had some influence on clients if they were already contemplating changing their 
auditor. Untabulated results reveal that performing the same tests with the entire sample of all fiscal 
year-end clients produces significant results, but they are weaker. The coefficient of interest, 
D*POST, is significant at the 10% and 5% level for the tests of primary interests (only auditor 
changes involving client dismissals). 
     The last analysis partitions the sample based on the auditor expertise variable. The coefficient of 






Additional Sensitivity Tests  
     Auditor changes involving reportable events or disagreements with the auditor may have more to 
do with increased risks in the audit engagement rather than possible concerns about auditor 
reputation. Reportable events involve the disclosure if in the two most recent fiscal years the auditor 
had advised the client of any of the following: internal controls necessary to develop reliable 
financial statements do not exist; the auditor was unwilling to rely on management’s 
representations; the scope of the audit needs to be significantly expanded; or information has 
become available that materially affects the fairness or reliability of a previously issued audit report 
or financial statements. Therefore, I perform the same analyses as reported in Tables 19-22 with the 
additional constraint of removing any auditor changes involving disagreements or reportable 
events.41 I discuss only the findings for the sample of primary interest: U.S. clients with auditor 
changes only involving client dismissals (equivalent to specification 2 in Tables 19-22). 
Untabulated results for the samples of December year-end clients in highly litigated industries and 
December year-end clients with tenure greater than three years are unchanged from the results 
found in Tables 21 and 22.42  However, the interaction coefficient, D*POST, is not significant in the 
samples of all fiscal year-end clients or December year-end clients (equivalent to Tables 19 and 20). 
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 For the sample of U.S clients, there are 20 auditor changes involving disagreements (19 of which also have 
a reportable event) and 286 auditor changes involving reportable events. This represents a total of 287 auditor 
changes involving either condition; 212 of these auditor switches were for client dismissals and 75 were 
related to auditor resignations or the auditors’ decision not to stand for re-election. 
42
 Because of the smaller sample size a reduction in the number of independent variables is necessary. For the 
tenure test, I use Fama-French 5 rather than Fama-French 12 to control for industries. For the litigated test, I 
perform a stepwise regression to determine the most significant control variables to include. These variables 
are SIZE, ABSDACC, and GROWTH. I also include TREND, D, POST, and D*POST. 
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VI. Market Reaction Replication – Dee et al. (2011) 
In this section I replicate the market model analysis and Schipper and Thompson (1983) analysis 
found in Dee et al. (2011) (hereafter referred to as “DLZ”). This study performed a market reaction 
analysis to the public release of the PCAOB sanction which occurred on December 10, 2007. I 
utilize the same data sources and procedures outlined previously in Section III. DLZ does not 
identify whether their sample includes U.S. only clients or all clients (U.S. and Non U.S.); thus, I 
perform analyses with both categories. DLZ reports results for three event windows: Day (0), Day 
(0,+1) and Day (0,+2). 
[Insert Tables 23-24 about here] 
     Table 23 reports the results of the market model analysis. Panels A, B, and C provide results for 
each of the event windows. The first row contains the results presented in DLZ; the second row is 
for the sample of U.S. only clients and the third row is for the sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients. 
The results for the sample of U.S. clients are generally the closest to the results reported in DLZ, 
thus I focus most of my discussion and comparison to this group. The mean and median CARs in 
this group (U.S. only clients) always exhibit the same sign as those reported in DLZ and the 
significance of the median CARS is almost always at the same level as that reported in DLZ (refer 
to the Wilcoxon signed rank test columns). The significance for Deloitte mean CARs is always one 
level below that reported in DLZ (refer to Mean t-test column). I find that Deloitte clients mean 
CARs were significantly different from zero at the 5% level while DLZ reports significance at the 
1% level. This is probably due to the fact that I did not obtain the exact same sample size and there 
is some difference between the two mean CARs (mine and DLZ), although my Deloitte CARs are 
the same sign and also more negative than the other Big N CARs which are both consistent with 
DLZ.  
     In terms of whether the two auditor groups have different mean and median CARs from each 
other, the most similar results I achieve are for the Day (0) event window. DLZ reports that the two 
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groups have both mean and median CARS that are different from each other at the 1% significance 
level. In my U.S. only clients sample, I find the same level of statistical significance for the median 
CARs, but one lower level of significance (i.e. 5%) for the mean CARs. For the test of differences 
in means (t-tests) between the two groups I report two sets of results: the first assumes an equal 
variance between the two groups and the second assumes an unequal variance. DLZ does not 
indicate if they performed a variance ratio test or whether the two groups had equal or unequal 
variances, therefore I report both sets of results. I do not find the same levels of significance 
between the auditor groups for the event windows of Day (0,+1) or Day (0,+2). This is somewhat 
surprising since I did find a similar result to DLZ for the Day (0) window and I utilize the same 
dataset (with the same companies) to test all three event windows; I am just using some additional 
days to test these other two event windows. These differences are probably due to the fact that I did 
not obtain the exact same sample size (same companies) or the same mean CAR as DLZ.  Below is 






(Under)   
Other Big 
N Clients  
Over/ 
(Under)   
Total 
Difference 
U.S. only clients 707    (144)   2,363  (259)   (403) 
U.S. & Non U.S. 
Clients 707    (6)   2,363  157    151  
 
 
     DLZ provides very limited information regarding how they put together their sample. The only 
thing I know is that 120 days of stock prices were required and that Audit Analytics was used to 
determine who the auditor was; a GICS industry sector analysis is performed but no results are 
displayed, thus, I cannot do an industry sample size comparison. There are many small decisions 
that are necessary when putting a dataset together and it is likely that these choices affected the final 
company composition in my sample versus that found in DLZ. For example, there are several 
options that could be used in determining who the auditor was. Someone could use the Audit 
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Opinions module of Audit Analytics as their starting point, while another researcher could use the 
Audit Fees module of Audit Analytics as their starting point. In addition, one person could 
determine auditor identity by using the closest audit opinion issued before the event date and make 
adjustments for any subsequent auditor changes by using the Auditor Changes module of Audit 
Analytics. On the other hand, someone else could use the most recent audit opinion that includes the 
event date. Differences in datasets could also arise from decisions made related to daily stock price 
data. For example, one researcher might decide that if a company has two classes of stock that they 
will only use prices from the one that has the highest trading volume because the other class is often 
thinly traded and held by a small number of owners such as family and employees. However, 
another researcher could decide to perform their analysis with both classes of stock. Some 
individuals may choose to replace daily stock data that has either missing values or negative prices 
with the most recent prior day valid stock price, while others could perhaps follow some other 
approach. These are just some examples of differences that can arise in creating a dataset. There is 
not necessarily one right approach; there can be many different decisions that occur that are 
reasonable but different between different researchers. I created several other alternative datasets 
from some of these choices previously mentioned, however, I still do not ever obtain a significant 
difference in mean CARs between the  two auditor groups for the event windows of Day (0,+1) or 
Day (0,+2) and no difference in median CARs for Day (0,+2).  The only new difference I find is 
that in three of these other alternative datasets the median CARs between the two groups are 
significantly different from each other at the 10% level, whereas in the results reported in Table 24 I 
did not find a significant difference. 
     Table 24 reports the results of the Schipper and Thompson (1983) analysis. DLZ report t-
statistics rather than p-values for this analysis, thus I report my results with this measure as well. 
DLZ does not mention the use of robust standard errors; however, I report two sets of t-statistics for 
the coefficient of interest (Event). The first is without robust standard errors and the second t-
statistic is with robust standard errors; the results with robust standard errors for the sample of U.S. 
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only clients are the most similar to the DLZ study. For the portfolio of other Big N clients, DLZ do 
not report a significant coefficient on the Event variable for any of the three event windows; this is 
consistent with my results for both the robust standard errors and the non-robust standard errors. For 
the portfolio of Deloitte clients, DLZ report a negative and significant coefficient at the 5%  level 
on Day (0). I find a similar result with the robust standard errors with a significance level of 1%. 
For Day (0,+1), DLZ do not find a significant coefficient on the Event variable. This is consistent 
with my result for the non-robust standard errors; however, with the robust standard errors the 
coefficient on the Event variable is significant at the 10% level. For Day (0,+2), DLZ report a 
negative and significant coefficient at the 5%  level. This is consistent with my result for the robust 
standard errors; however, with the non-robust standard errors the coefficient on the Event variable 
















     This study is not attempting to make any judgments on whether the PCAOB inspection process 
itself is valuable, but rather whether infrequent and new types of information related to an 
accounting firm’s quality control is informative to clients and investors. I examine if there is an 
increase in client dismissals at Deloitte after the PCAOB sanction is made public and whether there 
is a stock market reaction to the public release of new portions of the 2007 Deloitte PCAOB 
inspection report (“Part II”). 
      I find a client response to the PCAOB sanction, but only with clients of certain characteristics. 
For the sample of U.S. clients, I do not find an increase in the likelihood of Deloitte being dismissed 
among the entire Deloitte client base.  However, I do find that December year-end clients operating 
in highly litigated industries or those with tenure greater than three years are more likely to dismiss 
Deloitte in the post-sanction period. For the sample of U.S. highly litigated clients, the odds of 
Deloitte being dismissed after the PCOAB sanction are 180% higher than the odds of other Big N 
auditors being dismissed, after controlling for differences across time. For the sample of U.S. clients 
with tenure greater than three years, the odds of Deloitte being dismissed after the PCOAB sanction 
are 107% higher than the odds of other Big N auditors being dismissed, after controlling for 
differences across time.  Concerns about auditor reputation, the perceived credibility of financial 
statements and the potential for shareholder litigation are potential factors driving this result. Thus, 
the release of new quality control information by the PCAOB is associated with an increase in client 
dismissals where litigation may be of particular concern. One limitation is that these results are 
generalizable to Deloitte’s publicly traded clients; however, accounting firms do provide auditing 
services to various other types of organizations such as private companies, not-for-profits, and 
governmental entities. Information on these other types of clients is not as widely available; 




      Despite finding a negative and significant market reaction for Deloitte’s U.S. clients in the 
market model analysis surrounding the release of “Part II”, there is no evidence that this market 
reaction was different from that of clients of other Big N auditors. Additional tests provide marginal 
evidence of a negative reaction to the release of Part II for the sample of Deloitte’s U.S. and Non U. 
S. clients, with results driven by the subset of Deloitte China clients. Therefore, unlike Dee et al. 
(2011) who find a negative market reaction to the PCAOB sanction announcement, I find limited 
evidence that the market is reacting to the release of the first Big N Part II PCAOB inspection 
report. I also find no strong evidence to support that there was a decrease in the perceived earnings 
quality for Deloitte clients after either the PCAOB sanction or the release of the Part II report in the 
earnings response coefficient analysis. 
     There could be multiple reasons for the outcome in the market reaction analysis and earnings 
response coefficient analysis. There could be no decrease in the perceived earnings quality of 
Deloitte clients if investors perceived the issues identified as isolated incidents not likely to affect 
the quality of engagements across the entire firm. Also, investors may not perceive that the 
information itself was informative either because of the content of the disclosure or because of the 
considerable lapse in time between when the issues occurred and when they were revealed to the 
public. There is no meaningful way to decipher between these alternatives with publicly available 
data. There also may not be an observable response in the earnings response coefficient analysis 
because there was already a documented market reaction response around the release of the sanction 
against Deloitte and perhaps the news was only a temporary shock which investors quickly forgot. 
There also could be no observable response to the Part II disclosure both in the market reaction and 
earnings response coefficient analyses because this was the second unusual disclosure from the 
PCAOB about Deloitte and perhaps it did not concern investors as much because they had already 
seen one unfavorable disclosure concerning this accounting firm. 
     Although there is limited evidence of observable investor responses to the public release of Part 
II, I am not suggesting that there is no valuable information in the Part II section of a PCAOB 
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inspection report or to the release of Part II of an inspection report. It is feasible that the threat of 
the PCAOB releasing a Part II report and/or the eventual release of a Part II report will enact change 
at a public accounting firm. For example, on the day of the release of Deloitte’s Part II 2007 report, 
the CEO stated “We have been making a series of investments focused on strengthening and 
improving our practice.” (Cohn 2011).  Corroborating evidence of this can be found in the most 
recent peer review report for Deloitte for the period ending March 31, 2011. The report discloses 
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Other Big N 
clients 
Big N auditor (according to Audit Analytics) with data on 
Compustat 955  3,147  
Less: Not matched to CRSP (1) (9) 
Sample with data on both CRSP and Compustat 954  3,138  
Less: Insufficient returns on CRSP (85) (264) 
Sample with sufficient return data  869  2,874  
Less: Companies with potentially value relevant disclosures  (40) 
 
(119) 
 Sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients 829  2,755  
Less: Companies with a Big N auditor outside the U.S. (159) (430) 







Table 2: Schipper and Thompson (1983) regressions 
Rpt = α + βpRmt  + ∑δpkEventkt + εpt 
Panel A: Deloitte Clients 
Window (-1) (0) (1) (2) (-1 , +1)  (0, +1)  (0, +2) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
U.S. only clients  (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value) 
Constant 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.833 0.854 0.775 0.818 0.874 0.833 0.858 
Rm 1.0422 1.0397 1.0408 1.0409 1.0418 1.0413 1.0409 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Event -0.0026 -0.0038 0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0014 
0.405 0.230 0.692 0.630 0.344 0.571 0.457 
Adjusted R2 0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96 
Window (-1) (0) (1) (2) (-1 , +1)  (0, +1)  (0, +2) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
U.S. and  Non U.S. clients (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value) 
Constant -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
0.268 0.279 0.248 0.255 0.311 0.283 0.296 
Rm 1.0525 1.0498 1.0516 1.0511 1.0523 1.0514 1.0509 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Event -0.0029 -0.0041 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0019 
0.348 0.193 0.891 0.699 0.169 0.31 0.291 
Adjusted R2 0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96 
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Table 2: Continued 
Panel B: Other Big N Clients  
Window (-1) (0) (1) (2) (-1 , +1)  (0, +1)  (0, +2) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
U.S. only clients  (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value) 
Constant 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
0.172 0.178 0.191 0.179 0.178 0.188 0.185 
Rm 1.1012 1.1001 1.0997 1.1002 1.1006 1.1004 1.1005 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Event -0.0022 -0.0009 0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 
0.604 0.831 0.675 0.868 0.857 0.884 0.982 
Adjusted R2 0.93   0.93   0.93   0.93   0.93   0.93   0.93 
Window (-1) (0) (1) (2) (-1 , +1)  (0, +1)  (0, +2) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
U.S. and Non U.S. clients (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value) 
Constant 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
0.246 0.278 0.267 0.253 0.266 0.282 0.274 
Rm 1.0962 1.0962 1.0951 1.0950 1.0954 1.0954 1.0955 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Event -0.0025 0.0020 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0013 0.0004 
0.515 0.605 0.878 0.713 0.992 0.636 0.862 
Adjusted R2 0.94   0.94   0.94   0.94   0.94   0.94   0.94 
Observations are the daily portfolio of the 670 (829) U.S. Deloitte clients (U.S. and Non U.S. clients) and 2,325 (2,755) U.S. other Big N clients (U.S. and Non 
U.S.) for the 253 trading days from November 15, 2010 to November 14, 2011.  
Rpt  =  equally weighted portfolio return for all clients of Deloitte (or all other Big N clients) on day t  
Rmt = market return on day t (proxied by CRSP value-weighted index) 
Eventkt = a dummy variable equal to one for the event window and zero for all other days in the estimation period. The event date is October 17, 2011 (Day 0); 
the day of the release of Part II – Issues Related to Quality Control. 




Table 3: Schipper and Thompson (1983) regressions - returns winsorized  
Rpt = α + βpRmt  + ∑δpkEventkt + εpt 
Panel A: Deloitte Clients 
Window (-1) (0) (1) (2) (-1 , +1)  (0, +1)  (0, +2) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
U.S. only clients (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value) 
Constant -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
0.450 0.506 0.410 0.461 0.486 0.474 0.497 
Rm 0.9878 0.9856 0.9866 0.9871 0.9879 0.9875 0.9871 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Event -0.0008 -0.0048 0.0023 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0013 
0.772 0.085* 0.409 0.584 0.495 0.530 0.406 
Adjusted R2 0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96 
Window (-1) (0) (1) (2) (-1 , +1)  (0, +1)  (0, +2) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
U.S. and Non U.S. clients (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value) 
Constant -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
0.030** 0.037 0.026** 0.03** 0.038** 0.036** 0.039** 
Rm 0.9931 0.9907 0.9924 0.9923 0.9933 0.9927 0.9922 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Event -0.0011 -0.0050 0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0018 
0.658 0.053* 0.735 0.577 0.240 0.262 0.214 
Adjusted R2 0.97   0.97   0.97   0.97   0.97   0.97   0.97 
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Table 3: Continued 
Panel B: Other Big N Clients  
Window (-1) (0) (1) (2) (-1 , +1)  (0, +1)  (0, +2) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
U.S. only clients (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value) 
Constant -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
0.251 0.275 0.215 0.249 0.261 0.249 0.26 
Rm 1.0440 1.0419 1.0423 1.0433 1.0438 1.0436 1.0434 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Event -0.0014 -0.0041 0.0031 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0007 
0.658 0.179 0.311 0.72 0.656 0.817 0.691 
Adjusted R2 0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96   0.96 
Window (-1) (0) (1) (2) (-1 , +1)  (0, +1)  (0, +2) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
U.S. and Non U.S. clients (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value) 
Constant -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
0.065* 0.071 0.054* 0.065* 0.071* 0.065* 0.071* 
Rm 1.0370 1.0351 1.0357 1.0360 1.0368 1.0365 1.0362 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Event -0.0016 -0.0034 0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0010 
0.567 0.223 0.484 0.557 0.529 0.715 0.523 
Adjusted R2 0.97   0.96   0.97   0.97   0.97   0.97   0.97 
               
 
Observations are  the daily portfolio of the 670 (829) U.S. Deloitte clients (U.S. and Non U.S.) and 2,325 (2,755) U.S. other Big N clients (U.S. and Non U.S.) for 
the 253 trading days from November 15, 2010 to November 14, 2011. Returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Rpt  =  equally weighted portfolio return for all clients of Deloitte (or all other Big N clients) on day t 
Rmt = market return on day t (proxied by CRSP value-weighted index) 
Eventkt = a dummy variable equal to one for the event window and zero for all other days in the estimation period. The event date is October 17, 2011 (Day 0); 
the day of the release of Part II – Issues Related to Quality Control. 




Table 4: Industry sector analysis - Schipper and Thompson regressions 
Rpt = α + βpRmt  + ∑δpkEventkt + εpt 
 
All coefficients are for the Event dummy. 
           
Panel A: Deloitte Clients  
Window (-1) (0) (1) (2) (-1 , +1)  (0, +1)  (0, +2) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
U.S. only clients (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value) 
Energy -0.0002 0.0097 0.0087 0.0023 0.0061 0.0092 0.0069 
0.977 0.226 0.275 0.778 0.189 0.104 0.135 
Materials -0.0024 -0.0141 0.0064 -0.0110 -0.0033 -0.0038 -0.0062 
0.745 0.052 0.376 0.129 0.426 0.458 0.137 
Industrials -0.0011 -0.0112 0.0056 -0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0028 -0.0027 
0.849 0.056* 0.344 0.667 0.507 0.499 0.422 
Consumer Discretionary -0.0052 -0.0020 -0.0051 0.0027 -0.0041 -0.0035 -0.0015 
0.384 0.740 0.395 0.648 0.235 0.404 0.676 
Consumer Staples 0.0048 -0.0088 -0.0064 -0.0053 -0.0035 -0.0076 -0.0068 
0.462 0.180 0.330 0.417 0.362 0.102 0.070* 
Health Care -0.0087 -0.0077 -0.0071 0.0023 -0.0078 -0.0074 -0.0042 
0.213 0.270 0.305 0.744 0.051* 0.133 0.298 
Financials -0.0079 -0.0069 0.0125 -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0028 0.0019 
0.198 0.266 0.042** 0.991 0.830 0.518 0.602 
Information Technology -0.0041 -0.0084 0.0009 -0.0174 -0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0083 
0.597 0.278 0.910 0.023** 0.386 0.494 0.061* 
Telecommunication Services -0.0134 -0.0162 -0.0065 -0.0076 -0.0121 -0.0113 -0.0102 
0.398 0.307 0.681 0.630 0.187 0.312 0.268 
Utilities -0.0048 0.0079 -0.0027 0.0083 0.0001 0.0026 0.0045 
0.341 0.116 0.590 0.099* 0.966 0.468 0.121 
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Table 4: Continued 
Panel B: Other Big N Clients  
Window (-1) (0) (1) (2) (-1 , +1)  (0, +1)  (0, +2) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
U.S. only clients (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value) 
Energy 0.0171 0.0135 0.0023 0.0036 0.0110 0.0079 0.0065 
0.095* 0.189 0.825 0.728 0.064* 0.279 0.277 
Materials -0.0011 -0.0112 0.0023 -0.0107 -0.0033 -0.0044 -0.0065 
0.830 0.031** 0.658 0.039** 0.268 0.229 0.029** 
Industrials -0.0030 -0.0065 0.0030 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0019 
0.593 0.252 0.596 0.713 0.506 0.664 0.570 
Consumer Discretionary -0.0068 -0.0031 -0.0021 0.0049 -0.0040 -0.0026 -0.0001 
0.351 0.669 0.773 0.506 0.341 0.613 0.977 
Consumer Staples -0.0002 -0.0024 -0.0024 0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0024 -0.0012 
0.957 0.576 0.563 0.753 0.491 0.422 0.635 
Health Care -0.0017 0.0020 -0.0042 0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0003 
0.822 0.788 0.566 0.840 0.759 0.830 0.953 
Financials -0.0080 0.0028 0.0157 0.0007 0.0035 0.0092 0.0064 
0.667 0.882 0.398 0.971 0.745 0.483 0.552 
Information Technology -0.0051 -0.0083 0.0004 -0.0102 -0.0044 -0.0040 -0.0061 
0.415 0.184 0.953 0.102 0.229 0.371 0.093* 
Telecommunication Services -0.0067 0.0029 -0.0083 -0.0029 -0.0040 -0.0027 -0.0028 
0.853 0.936 0.817 0.935 0.845 0.915 0.893 
Utilities -0.0032 0.0037 -0.0047 0.0057 -0.0014 -0.0005 0.0016 
0.516 0.451 0.340 0.244 0.623 0.887 0.577 
 
Observations are  the daily portfolio of the 528 U.S. Deloitte clients and 1,970  U.S. other Big N clients for the 253 trading days from November 15, 2010 to 
November 14, 2011.  
Rpt  =  equally weighted portfolio return for all clients of Deloitte (or all other Big N clients) on day t . 
Rmt = market return on day t (proxied by CRSP value-weighted index) 
Eventkt = a dummy variable equal to one for the event window and zero for all other days in the estimation period. The event date is October 17, 2011 (Day 0); 
the day of the release of Part II – Issues Related to Quality Control.  




Table 5: Abnormal returns surrounding the release of Part II  
Panel A: U.S. only clients 









signed Mean Median 
Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR rank test Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR rank test (p-value) (p-value) 
(-1) 53.3% -0.23% 0.035** -0.10% 0.049** 56.9% -0.21% 0.001*** -0.23% 0.000*** 0.838 0.048** 
(0) 55.4% -0.39% 0.000*** -0.18% 0.000*** 58.5% -0.10% 0.617 -0.34% 0.000*** 0.187 0.384 
(1) 47.3% 0.16% 0.180 0.08% 0.058* 45.8% 0.19% 0.001*** 0.15% 0.000*** 0.776 0.375 
(2) 48.5% -0.16% 0.09* 0.07% 0.619 50.5% -0.08% 0.181 -0.01% 0.025** 0.448 0.663 
(-1 , +1) 51.0% -0.47% 0.012** -0.05% 0.016** 55.0% -0.11% 0.604 -0.31% 0.000*** 0.218 0.301 
 (0, +1) 51.0% -0.24% 0.103 -0.02% 0.036** 52.9% 0.09% 0.660 -0.11% 0.003*** 0.195 0.673 
 (0, +2) 52.2% -0.40% 0.026** -0.12% 0.010*** 52.9% 0.01% 0.948 -0.15% 0.000*** 0.148 0.773 
                  
Panel B: U.S. and Non U.S. clients 









signed Mean Median 
Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR rank test Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR rank test (p-value) (p-value) 
(-1) 54.0% -0.26% 0.008*** -0.13% 0.006*** 57.1% -0.24% 0.000*** -0.26% 0.000*** 0.892 0.084* 
(0) 55.0% -0.43% 0.000*** -0.18% 0.000*** 57.5% 0.19% 0.552 -0.32% 0.000*** 0.059* 0.898 
(1) 49.2% 0.00% 0.971 0.02% 0.675 48.1% 0.07% 0.216 0.08% 0.014** 0.542 0.387 
(2) 49.1% -0.14% 0.125 0.06% 0.457 50.9% -0.15% 0.007*** -0.02% 0.002*** 0.928 0.461 
(-1 , +1) 53.2% -0.69% 0.000*** -0.21% 0.000*** 56.1% 0.02% 0.958 -0.38% 0.000*** 0.053* 0.630 
 (0, +1) 52.5% -0.43% 0.001*** -0.06% 0.001*** 54.3% 0.26% 0.417 -0.17% 0.000*** 0.045** 0.409 







Table 5: Continued 
Panel C: Sign Test 
U.S. only clients U.S. and Non U.S. clients 
Deloitte Clients Other Big N Clients Deloitte Clients Other Big N Clients 
Window z -Stat. (p-value) z -Stat. (p-value) Window z -Stat. (p-value) z -Stat. (p-value) 
(-1) 1.012 0.312 3.877 0.000*** (-1) 1.388 0.165 4.369 0.000*** 
(0) 1.773 0.076* 5.009 0.000*** (0) 1.779 0.075* 4.636 0.000*** 
(1) -1.165 0.244 -3.615 0.000*** (1) -0.567 0.571 -2.242 0.025** 
(2) -0.730 0.466 -0.450 0.653 (2) -0.616 0.538 -0.242 0.808 
(-1 , +1) 0.195 0.845 2.628 0.009*** (-1 , +1) 1.046 0.296 3.596 0.000*** 
 (0, +1) 0.195 0.845 1.205 0.228  (0, +1) 0.753 0.452 2.263 0.024** 
 (0, +2) 0.631 0.528 1.176 0.240  (0, +2) 1.241 0.215 1.863 0.062* 




Abnormal returns are calculated using the standard market model methodology using 250 trading days prior to the event date (October 17, 2011 – Day 0) 
(excluding the 10 days before Day 0) and the CRSP value-weighted return (with dividends) to substitute for the market return. The abnormal return for firm i on 
day t (ARit) is the difference between the firm’s return and the estimated return; the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of the abnormal returns over 
the event window.  
 
The sign test examines whether the group analyzed (Deloitte or other Big N) had a higher proportion of negative cumulative abnormal returns in the event 
window compared to the estimation period (250 trading days prior to the event date excluding the 10 days before Day 0) (Cowan 1992). 
 
aTest of Differences present the p-values for mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon test) values. 





Table 6: Abnormal returns surrounding  the release of Part II – returns winsorized  
Panel A: U.S. only clients  









signed Mean Median 
Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR rank test Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR rank test (p-value) (p-value) 
(-1) 51.3% -0.03% 0.679 -0.05% 0.727 54.3% -0.10% 0.017** -0.15% 0.000*** 0.394 0.058* 
(0) 58.8% -0.52% 0.000*** -0.31% 0.000*** 61.7% -0.45% 0.000*** -0.42% 0.000*** 0.451 0.485 
(1) 44.6% 0.27% 0.001*** 0.16% 0.001*** 43.5% 0.34% 0.000*** 0.26% 0.000*** 0.408 0.215 
(2) 49.7% -0.18% 0.012** 0.01% 0.096* 52.1% -0.14% 0.002*** -0.06% 0.000*** 0.646 0.766 
(-1 , +1) 50.0% -0.28% 0.014** 0.01% 0.119 53.6% -0.21% 0.003*** -0.21% 0.000*** 0.608 0.411 
 (0, +1) 51.0% -0.25% 0.006*** -0.01% 0.026** 52.3% -0.11% 0.047** -0.08% 0.013** 0.195 0.455 
 (0, +2) 53.0% -0.43% 0.000*** -0.14% 0.001*** 53.4% -0.26% 0.001*** -0.19% 0.000*** 0.212 0.557 
 
         
Panel B: U.S. and Non U.S. clients  









signed Mean Median 
Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR rank test Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR rank test (p-value) (p-value) 
(-1) 51.6% -0.06% 0.365 -0.07% 0.369 54.5% -0.13% 0.002*** -0.16% 0.000*** 0.406 0.089* 
(0) 58.1% -0.54% 0.000*** -0.30% 0.000*** 60.4% -0.38% 0.000*** -0.40% 0.000*** 0.061* 0.895 
(1) 46.6% 0.13% 0.094* 0.12% 0.034** 45.8% 0.23% 0.000*** 0.18% 0.000*** 0.271 0.228 
(2) 50.2% -0.18% 0.015** -0.01% 0.057* 52.6% -0.19% 0.000*** -0.08% 0.000*** 0.842 0.541 
(-1 , +1) 52.1% -0.47% 0.000*** -0.10% 0.002*** 54.6% -0.28% 0.000*** -0.28% 0.000*** 0.154 0.872 
 (0, +1) 52.4% -0.41% 0.000*** -0.06% 0.000*** 53.6% -0.16% 0.004*** -0.13% 0.000*** 0.019** 0.237 







Table 6: Continued 
Panel C: Sign Test  
U.S. only clients U.S. and Non U.S. clients 
Deloitte Clients Other Big N Clients Deloitte Clients Other Big N Clients 
Window z -Stat. (p-value) z -Stat. (p-value) Window z -Stat. (p-value) z -Stat. (p-value) 
(-1) 0.341 0.733 2.437 0.015** (-1) 0.471 0.638 2.767 0.006*** 
(0) 3.065 0.002*** 7.421 0.000*** (0) 3.113 0.002*** 7.103 0.000*** 
(1) -2.110 0.035** -4.908 0.000*** (1) -1.585 0.113 -3.630 0.000*** 
(2) -0.258 0.796 0.921 0.357 (2) -0.117 0.907 1.348 0.178 
(-1 , +1) -0.149 0.882 1.942 0.052* (-1 , +1) 0.666 0.505 2.794 0.005*** 
 (0, +1) 0.232 0.816 1.096 0.273  (0, +1) 0.764 0.445 2.071 0.038 
 (0, +2) 0.940 0.347 1.825 0.068*  (0, +2) 1.547 0.122 2.392 0.017** 
N 670 2325 N 829 2755 
 
 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the standard market model methodology using 250 trading days prior to the event date (October 17, 2011 – Day 0) 
(excluding the 10 days before Day 0) and the CRSP value-weighted return (with dividends) to substitute for the market return. The abnormal return for firm i on 
day t (ARit) is the difference between the firm’s return and the estimated return; the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of the abnormal returns over 
the event window. Returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
The sign test examines whether the group analyzed (Deloitte or other Big N) had a higher proportion of negative cumulative abnormal returns in the event 
window compared to the estimation period (250 trading days prior to the event date excluding the 10 days before Day 0) (Cowan 1992). 
 
aTest of Differences present the p-values for mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon test) values. 






Table 7: Industry sector analysis - abnormal returns surrounding the release of Part II  
Panel A: Day (0) 









signed Mean Median 








(%)   CAR (p-value) CAR  rank test (p-value) (p-value) 
Energy 7.2% 44.7% 0.97% 0.304 0.12% 0.577 7.4% 38.4% 1.30% 0.001*** 0.82% 0.002*** 0.746 0.363 
Materials 5.1% 81.5% -1.51% 0.001*** -1.66% 0.001*** 4.8% 79.8% -1.20% 0.000*** -0.94% 0.000*** 0.453 0.227 
Industrials 16.5% 69.0% -1.20% 0.000*** -0.94% 0.000*** 13.4% 69.3% -0.70% 0.000*** -0.80% 0.000*** 0.050** 0.181 
Consumer Discretionary 19.1% 58.4% -0.21% 0.260 -0.40% 0.155 14.6% 54.0% -0.29% 0.063 -0.25% 0.039** 0.727 0.973 
Consumer Staples 3.4% 72.2% -0.95% 0.01*** -0.41% 0.012** 3.9% 61.8% -0.25% 0.244 -0.17% 0.165 0.138 0.089* 
Health Care 9.1% 68.8% -0.76% 0.032** -0.84% 0.004 15.7% 66.3% 0.22% 0.789 -0.65% 0.000*** 0.277 0.889 
Financials 16.1% 65.9% -0.80% 0.001*** -0.68% 0.000*** 18.5% 69.0% 0.25% 0.810 -0.76% 0.000*** 0.326 0.465 
Information Technology 15.2% 65.0% -0.84% 0.001*** -0.74% 0.001*** 18.2% 64.9% -0.88% 0.000*** -0.71% 0.000*** 0.881 0.988 
Telecommunication Services 1.1% 50.0% -1.58% 0.356 -0.25% 0.600 1.3% 28.0% 0.38% 0.321 0.73% 0.083* 0.270 0.271 
Utilities 7.2% 10.5% 0.81% 0.000*** 0.67% 0.000*** 2.3% 31.1% 0.36% 0.191 0.43% 0.016** 0.146 0.201 








Table 7: Continued                   
                   
Panel B: Days (0,+2) 









signed Mean Median 








(%)   CAR (p-value) CAR  rank test (p-value) (p-value) 
Energy 7.2% 47.4% 2.03% 0.224 0.05% 0.617 7.4% 37.7% 1.89% 0.000*** 1.28% 0.000*** 0.936 0.151 
Materials 5.1% 74.1% -1.89% 0.023** -1.94% 0.017** 4.8% 74.5% -2.07% 0.000*** -1.67% 0.000*** 0.828 0.980 
Industrials 16.5% 60.9% -0.86% 0.013** -0.94% 0.003*** 13.4% 60.2% -0.58% 0.006*** -0.54% 0.001*** 0.496 0.341 
Consumer Discretionary 19.1% 54.5% -0.42% 0.477 -0.45% 0.688 14.6% 55.1% -0.05% 0.890 -0.38% 0.140 0.585 0.652 
Consumer Staples 3.4% 88.9% -2.12% 0.002*** -1.67% 0.002*** 3.9% 55.3% -0.38% 0.403 -0.15% 0.873 0.022** 0.002*** 
Health Care 9.1% 68.8% -1.27% 0.074* -1.16% 0.023** 15.7% 62.1% -0.06% 0.945 -0.93% 0.000*** 0.285 0.855 
Financials 16.1% 40.0% 0.46% 0.186 0.62% 0.042** 18.5% 35.3% 1.91% 0.086* 1.11% 0.000*** 0.215 0.140 
Information Technology 15.2% 76.3% -2.45% 0.000*** -1.59% 0.000*** 18.2% 74.1% -1.87% 0.000*** -1.58% 0.000*** 0.375 0.577 
Telecommunication Services 1.1% 83.3% -3.07% 0.130 -1.86% 0.116 1.3% 56.0% -0.25% 0.646 -0.18% 0.737 0.164 0.134 
Utilities 7.2% 7.9% 1.35% 0.000*** 1.48% 0.000*** 2.3% 24.4% 0.45% 0.225 0.48% 0.008*** 0.028** 0.019** 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the standard market model methodology using 250 trading days prior to the event date (October 17, 2011 – Day 0) 
(excluding the 10 days before Day 0) and the CRSP value-weighted return (with dividends) to substitute for the market return. The abnormal return for firm i on 
day t (ARit) is the difference between the firm’s return and the estimated return; the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of the abnormal returns over 
the event window.  
aTest of Differences present the p-values for mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon test) values. 




Table 8: Multivariate analysis of market reaction to the release of Part II  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
U.S. only clients 
Deloitte Clients (N=405)      
Mean Median Std. Dev.          
FINC_DISTRESS 0.042 0.000 0.142          
PREV_RET 0.028 0.034 0.332          
SIZE 7.211 7.268 1.667          
BM 0.503 0.452 0.391          
LEVERAGE 0.225 0.191 0.209          
SALE_GROWTH 0.190 0.090 1.070          
ROA 0.019 0.013 0.120          
GC 0.005 0.000 0.070          
TENURE 0.091 0.000 0.288          













Table 8: Continued        
        
Panel B: Sefcik and Thompson (1986) regressions  
Return j,t = α + βj Returnm,t + δjEventt + εjt   
Deloitte - U.S. only clients Deloitte - U.S. and Non U.S. clients 
Event Window Day (0) Day (0,+2) Day (0) Day (0,+2) 
  Coefficient (p-value)   Coefficient (p-value)   Coefficient (p-value)   Coefficient (p-value) 
CONSTANT 0.0027 0.739 0.0021 0.650 -0.0058 0.420 -0.0042 0.311 
FINC_DISTRESS 0.0365 0.007*** 0.0275 0.000*** 0.0010 0.905 -0.0016 0.750 
PREV_RET 0.0025 0.568 0.0009 0.707 0.0066 0.052* 0.0035 0.072* 
SIZE 0.0002 0.824 0.0001 0.835 0.0001 0.907 -0.0001 0.877 
BM 0.0029 0.324 0.0008 0.648 0.0034 0.193 -0.0003 0.824 
LEVERAGE -0.0031 0.735 -0.0048 0.358 -0.0007 0.926 0.0000 0.992 
SALE_GROWTH -0.0014 0.123 -0.0002 0.741 -0.0003 0.695 -0.0002 0.638 
ROA 0.0196 0.146 0.0079 0.314 0.0124 0.228 0.0036 0.547 
GC -0.0259 0.103 -0.0098 0.288 -0.0057 0.571 0.0018 0.757 
TENURE 0.0010 0.783 0.0012 0.574 -0.0025 0.505 -0.0014 0.521 
INST -0.0155 0.016** -0.0084 0.025** -0.0008 0.877 0.0036 0.250 
N 405 514 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The table presents the multivariate analysis of the market reaction to the release of Part II – Issues Related to Quality Control for Deloitte clients with information for computing 












weighted portfolio return on day t (t = 1, 2,…253) for firm characteristic p (p = 1, 2,… 11). Day t represents a trading day from 
November 15, 2010 to November 14, 2011. Firm characteristic j represents one of the firm-specific characteristics (including the 
constant) 
market return on day t (t = 1, 2, …, 253), proxied by the CRSP value-weighted index 






















Zmijewski’s (1984) financial distress measure / Sinkey (1987) 
cumulative raw returns from November 15, 2010 to September 15, 2011 
natural log of total assets (in million dollars) 
book value of equity divided by market value of equity 
ratio of total debt to total assets 
growth rate in sales 
two-digit SIC code median adjusted ROA 
equal to one if client received a going-concern explanatory paragraph opinion in the prior year 
equal to one if auditor tenure is 3 years or less 
percentage of institutional ownership, (number of shares owned by institutional investors / total shares outstanding). 
 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests.  
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Table 9: Sample - ERC Analysis 
Panel A: PCAOB Sanction sample 
Big N auditor (according to Audit Analytics) with data on Compustat, CRSP, and IBES 4,053  
Less: Companies that changed auditors  (172) 
Less: Companies with missing financial data (219) 
Sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients 3,662  
Less: Companies with a Big N auditor outside the U.S. (461) 
    
Sample of U.S. clients 3,201  
Panel B: Part II - Quality Control Disclosure Sample 
Big N auditor (according to Audit Analytics) with data on Compustat, CRSP, and IBES 4,201  
Less: Companies that changed auditors  (87) 
Less: Companies with missing financial data (529) 
Sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients 3,585  
Less: Companies with a Big N auditor outside the U.S. (126) 
    












Table 10: Descriptive Statistics -ERC Analysis 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for PCAOB Sanction sample 
            Test of Differencesa 
Deloitte Clients (N=812) Other Big N Clients (N=2850) Mean Median 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. (p-value) (p-value) 
CAR 0.006  0.002  0.073  0.002  0.002  0.077  0.244  0.515  
UE (0.002) 0.000  0.014  (0.002) 0.000  0.014  0.872  0.859  
EXPERT 0.333  0.000  0.471  0.324  0.000  0.468  0.643  0.643  
MB 2.862  2.169  3.099  3.325  2.349  4.604  0.001*** 0.010*** 
STDRET 0.024  0.022  0.013  0.025  0.023  0.013  0.181  0.057  
LEVERAGE 0.250  0.229  0.212  0.233  0.187  0.215  0.048** 0.013** 
MVE 7.527  7.408  1.572  7.496  7.373  1.655  0.626  0.380  
LOSS 0.214  0.000  0.411  0.225  0.000  0.417  0.535  0.535  
REST 0.037  0.000  0.189  0.020  0.000  0.139  0.015** 0.004*** 
ABSUE 0.006  0.002  0.017  0.006  0.002  0.018  0.550  0.866  



















Table 10: Continued 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for Part II - Quality Control  Disclosure sample 
     
 
             Test of Differencesa 
Deloitte Clients (N=799) Other Big N Clients (N=2786) Mean Median 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. (p-value) (p-value) 
CAR (0.005) (0.004) 0.074  (0.003) (0.002) 0.075  0.454 0.310 
UE 0.001  0.001  0.011  0.001  0.001  0.011  0.492 0.532 
EXPERT 0.344  0.000  0.475  0.321  0.000  0.467  0.209 0.209 
MB 2.259  1.531  3.396  2.505  1.651  3.907  0.082* 0.012** 
STDRET 0.029  0.028  0.013  0.030  0.029  0.012  0.063* 0.038** 
LEVERAGE 0.247  0.220  0.208  0.226  0.184  0.208  0.011** 0.003*** 
MVE 7.246  7.183  1.573  7.156  7.082  1.626  0.168 0.164 
LOSS 0.205  0.000  0.404  0.212  0.000  0.409  0.674 0.674 
REST 0.013  0.000  0.111  0.015  0.000  0.123  0.524 0.547 
ABSUE 0.006  0.002  0.013  0.006  0.002  0.012  0.678 0.252 
404b 0.901  1.000  0.299  0.898  1.000  0.302  0.823 0.823 
aTest of Differences present the p-values for mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon test) values. 
Refer to pages 26-27 for variable definitions. 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests.
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Table 11: ERC Analysis – PCAOB Sanction - CAR (-1,+1) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
CARit = βo + β1UEit + β2POST + β3Dit+ β4Dit*POST + β5UEit *Dit + β6UEit*POST  + β7UEit*Dit*POST + β8UEit*MBit + 
β9UEit *STDRETit * + β10UEit*LEVERAGEit + β11UEit*LOSSit + β12UEit* RESTit + β13UEit*MVEit +  β14UEit*ABSUEit  
+ β15UEit*EXPERTit  +   β16UEit*404bit  + β17UEit*INDUSTRYit   + εit 
 
U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All earnings 
announcements 
Announcements 
within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 




within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 
no SIC 6000 
Intercept 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.371) (0.960) (0.837) (0.433) (0.830) (0.675) 
UE 2.317** 5.055*** 6.804*** 2.597*** 4.903*** 7.449*** 
 (0.045) (0.001) (0.009) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) 
POST 0.001 0.008** -0.000 0.001 0.008** 0.001 
 (0.700) (0.023) (0.962) (0.682) (0.018) (0.836) 
D 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.470) (0.578) (0.521) (0.799) (0.950) (0.849) 
D*POST 0.002 -0.007 -0.002 0.004 -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.782) (0.386) (0.868) (0.506) (0.335) (0.823) 
UE*D -0.235 1.376 1.309 -0.708 0.759 0.860 
 (0.702) (0.430) (0.560) (0.175) (0.519) (0.634) 
UE*POST 0.033 1.353*** 1.423** -0.316 1.271*** 1.333** 
 (0.932) (0.008) (0.029) (0.374) (0.009) (0.034) 
UE*D*POST -0.638 -1.923 -2.279 -0.255 -1.067 -1.532 
 (0.410) (0.291) (0.324) (0.701) (0.402) (0.416) 
UE*MB 0.019 -0.020 0.032 0.037 0.004 0.069 
 (0.625) (0.792) (0.647) (0.327) (0.957) (0.298) 
UE*STDRET -3.656 -33.636** -16.902 0.871 -24.472* -15.457 
 (0.756) (0.015) (0.341) (0.934) (0.077) (0.404) 
UE*LEVERAGE 0.712 -0.483 -2.093 1.041** -0.352 -2.018 
 (0.205) (0.720) (0.223) (0.049) (0.785) (0.213) 
UE*LOSS -1.109** -1.791*** -2.235*** -1.006** -1.994*** -2.442*** 
 (0.025) (0.005) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.000) 
UE*REST 1.162** 0.831 1.335 0.927* 1.340 1.797 
 (0.042) (0.460) (0.298) (0.072) (0.211) (0.146) 
UE*MVE 0.070 -0.054 -0.136 -0.012 -0.122 -0.333 
 (0.599) (0.780) (0.671) (0.909) (0.508) (0.207) 
UE*ABSUE -14.251*** -18.544*** -30.024*** -14.630*** -20.937*** -30.306*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UE*EXPERT -0.182 0.489 1.371 -0.176 0.949 1.985** 
 (0.645) (0.544) (0.166) (0.629) (0.182) (0.036) 
UE*404b -0.186 -1.067 -1.361* -0.002 -0.769 -1.002 
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Table 11: Continued 
  U.S. clients                                             U.S. & Non U.S. clients  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All earnings 
announcements 
Announcements 
within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 




within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 
no SIC 6000 
       
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
N 3,201 1,956 1,412 3,662 2,169 1,588 
       
R-squared 0.046 0.061 0.069 0.045 0.063 0.068 
       
UE*D +UE*D*POST -0.873* -0.547 -0.097 -0.963** -0.307 -0.067 
 (0.055) (0.427) (0.356) (0.022) (0.627) (0.499) 















       
 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests.  
P-values are reported in brackets. 
 




























Table 12: ERC Analysis – PCAOB Sanction - CAR (-2,+2) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
CARit = βo + β1UEit + β2POST + β3Dit+ β4Dit*POST + β5UEit *Dit + β6UEit*POST  + β7UEit*Dit*POST + β8UEit*MBit + 
β9UEit *STDRETit * + β10UEit*LEVERAGEit + β11UEit*LOSSit + β12UEit* RESTit + β13UEit*MVEit +  β14UEit*ABSUEit  
+ β15UEit*EXPERTit  +   β16UEit*404bit    + β17UEit*INDUSTRYit   + εit 
 
U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All earnings 
announcements 
Announcements 
within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 




within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 
no SIC 6000 
Intercept 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 (0.123) (0.368) (0.284) (0.109) (0.295) (0.214) 
UE 2.839** 3.649** 5.152 3.028*** 4.080** 5.745** 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.103) (0.005) (0.013) (0.038) 
POST 0.001 0.010** -0.000 0.000 0.010*** 0.001 
 (0.838) (0.015) (0.964) (0.931) (0.009) (0.789) 
D 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.495) (0.657) (0.611) (0.840) (0.829) (0.794) 
D*POST 0.000 -0.011 -0.004 0.003 -0.012 -0.005 
 (0.994) (0.178) (0.669) (0.591) (0.120) (0.603) 
UE*D 0.508 1.230 0.884 -0.102 0.607 0.404 
 (0.471) (0.516) (0.728) (0.866) (0.645) (0.848) 
UE*POST 0.221 1.452** 1.672** -0.141 1.382** 1.543** 
 (0.570) (0.011) (0.019) (0.708) (0.013) (0.026) 
UE*D*POST -1.727* -2.046 -2.267 -1.091 -1.124 -1.285 
 (0.055) (0.313) (0.387) (0.159) (0.437) (0.553) 
UE*MB 0.041 -0.010 0.044 0.053 0.015 0.075 
 (0.330) (0.906) (0.578) (0.178) (0.868) (0.316) 
UE*STDRET -7.005 -40.760*** -19.182 -3.171 -30.548* -15.761 
 (0.585) (0.009) (0.315) (0.793) (0.051) (0.420) 
UE*LEVERAGE 0.737 -0.760 -3.806** 1.170** -0.574 -3.786** 
 (0.231) (0.619) (0.040) (0.046) (0.698) (0.033) 
UE*LOSS -1.123** -1.523** -1.894** -1.098** -2.010*** -2.298*** 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.019) (0.015) (0.003) (0.005) 
UE*REST 1.238* -0.042 0.477 0.947 0.643 1.052 
 (0.056) (0.973) (0.738) (0.111) (0.590) (0.452) 
UE*MVE 0.079 -0.052 -0.094 -0.034 -0.125 -0.235 
 (0.598) (0.811) (0.782) (0.787) (0.557) (0.419) 
UE*ABSUE -15.992*** -16.424** -31.457*** -15.617*** -20.174*** -31.505*** 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
UE*EXPERT -0.112 0.646 2.036* -0.126 1.185 2.536** 
 (0.790) (0.474) (0.067) (0.750) (0.132) (0.017) 
UE*404b -0.695 -0.132 -0.267 -0.253 -0.074 -0.014 
 (0.192) (0.904) (0.817) (0.572) (0.935) (0.989) 
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Table 12: Continued 
  U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All earnings 
announcements 
Announcements 
within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 




within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 
no SIC 6000 
       
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
N 3,201 1,956 1,412 3,662 2,169 1,588 
       
R-squared 0.047 0.062 0.077 0.044 0.064 0.074 
       
UE*D+UE*D*POST -1.219** -0.816   -1.383   -1.194** -0.517 -0.881 
 (0.028) (0.298) (0.197) (0.017) (0.475) (0.403) 
       
UE*POST+UE*D*POST -1.505* -0.594 -0.595 -1.23*   0.258 0.259 
 (0.085) (0.772) (0.825) (0.095) (0.861) (0.909) 
       
 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests.  
P-values are reported in brackets. 
 





























Table 13: ERC Analysis – Part II Quality Control Disclosure  - CAR (-1,+1) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
CARit = βo + β1UEit + β2POST + β3Dit+ β4Dit*POST + β5UEit *Dit + β6UEit*POST  + β7UEit*Dit*POST + β8UEit*MBit + 
β9UEit *STDRETit * + β10UEit*LEVERAGEit + β11UEit*LOSSit + β12UEit* RESTit + β13UEit*MVEit +  β14UEit*ABSUEit  
+ β15UEit*EXPERTit  +   β16UEit*404bit    + β17UEit*INDUSTRYit   + εit 
 
U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All earnings 
announcements 
Announcements 
within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 




within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 
no SIC 6000 
Intercept -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UE 3.560*** 3.578*** 5.504*** 2.688** 2.606** 3.822** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.021) (0.027) 
POST 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.263) (0.313) (0.789) (0.325) (0.308) (0.852) 
D -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.387) (0.349) (0.363) (0.230) (0.201) (0.249) 
D*POST 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.007 
 (0.494) (0.365) (0.299) (0.343) (0.288) (0.288) 
UE*D -0.380 -0.390 -0.138 -0.530 -0.501 -0.296 
 (0.450) (0.464) (0.808) (0.275) (0.331) (0.603) 
UE*POST 0.215 0.150 0.636 0.099 0.054 0.639 
 (0.544) (0.676) (0.138) (0.768) (0.873) (0.147) 
UE*D*POST 0.173 0.201 -0.091 0.351 0.383 -0.006 
 (0.802) (0.790) (0.915) (0.601) (0.602) (0.995) 
UE*MB 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.025 0.023 0.030 
 (0.624) (0.621) (0.485) (0.584) (0.604) (0.491) 
UE*STDRET 16.055 18.125 18.410 16.291 17.784 14.430 
 (0.201) (0.160) (0.240) (0.152) (0.127) (0.353) 
UE*LEVERAGE -0.415 -0.309 0.194 -0.016 0.124 0.822 
 (0.527) (0.661) (0.832) (0.980) (0.851) (0.369) 
UE*LOSS -1.218*** -1.223*** -1.785*** -1.143*** -1.105*** -1.571*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
UE*REST -1.000 -0.930 -0.766 -0.960 -0.932 -0.779 
 (0.248) (0.289) (0.413) (0.182) (0.197) (0.315) 
UE*MVE -0.172* -0.172* -0.391** -0.102 -0.093 -0.232 
 (0.093) (0.098) (0.033) (0.325) (0.380) (0.237) 
UE*ABSUE -27.028*** -29.166*** -44.201*** -23.482*** -25.438*** -36.879*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UE*EXPERT -0.500* -0.502 -0.545 -0.418 -0.394 -0.385 
 (0.095) (0.110) (0.196) (0.139) (0.182) (0.370) 
UE*404b 1.094*** 1.043*** 0.917* 1.096*** 1.049*** 0.970** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.060) (0.002) (0.005) (0.043) 
       
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 13: Continued 
  U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All earnings 
announcements 
Announcements 
within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 




within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 
no SIC 6000 
       
N 3,459 3,371 2,827 3,585 3,486 2,906 
       
R-squared 0.103 0.103 0.105 0.100 0.101 0.100 
       
       
UE*D+UE*D*POST -0.207 -0.189   -0.229 -0.179 -0.118 -0.302 
 (0.666) (0.722) (0.727) (0.697) (0.817) (0.642) 
       
UE*POST+UE*D*POST 0.388 0.351 0.544 0.450 0.437 0.633 
 (0.516) (0.596) (0.477) (0.438) (0.498) (0.411) 
       
 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests.  
P-values are reported in brackets. 
 






























Table 14: ERC Analysis – Part II Quality Control Disclosure - CAR (-2,+2) 
CARit = βo + β1UEit + β2POST + β3Dit+ β4Dit*POST + β5UEit *Dit + β6UEit*POST  + β7UEit*Dit*POST + β8UEit*MBit + 
β9UEit *STDRETit * + β10UEit*LEVERAGEit + β11UEit*LOSSit + β12UEit* RESTit + β13UEit*MVEit +  β14UEit*ABSUEit  
+ β15UEit*EXPERTit  +   β16UEit*404bit    + β17UEit*INDUSTRYit   + εit 
 
U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All earnings 
announcements 
Announcements 
within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 




within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 
no SIC 6000 
Intercept -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
UE 4.280*** 4.290*** 6.339*** 3.349*** 3.267** 4.765** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) 
POST 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.253) (0.309) (0.645) (0.260) (0.263) (0.830) 
D -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.329) (0.296) (0.302) (0.222) (0.180) (0.207) 
D*POST 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.010 
 (0.296) (0.231) (0.193) (0.207) (0.182) (0.193) 
UE*D -0.659 -0.674 -0.275 -0.842 -0.786 -0.477 
 (0.254) (0.266) (0.671) (0.128) (0.179) (0.465) 
UE*POST 0.544 0.459 0.926* 0.359 0.303 0.789 
 (0.199) (0.283) (0.073) (0.366) (0.447) (0.127) 
UE*D*POST 0.944 1.158 0.720 1.132 1.315 0.856 
 (0.238) (0.197) (0.488) (0.143) (0.126) (0.401) 
UE*MB 0.033 0.035 0.042 0.035 0.034 0.040 
 (0.551) (0.533) (0.439) (0.497) (0.515) (0.445) 
UE*STDRET 1.973 4.726 2.381 2.489 4.084 -0.768 
 (0.902) (0.774) (0.904) (0.861) (0.779) (0.969) 
UE*LEVERAGE -0.797 -0.675 -0.130 -0.059 0.122 0.834 
 (0.321) (0.426) (0.908) (0.942) (0.886) (0.481) 
UE*LOSS -1.083** -1.079** -1.659*** -1.092** -1.036** -1.526*** 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.007) (0.015) (0.026) (0.010) 
UE*REST -2.524** -2.465** -2.384* -2.212** -2.199** -2.120* 
 (0.039) (0.045) (0.064) (0.039) (0.040) (0.062) 
UE*MVE -0.193 -0.201 -0.463** -0.136 -0.137 -0.340 
 (0.129) (0.121) (0.034) (0.283) (0.289) (0.126) 
UE*ABSUE -26.188*** -28.316*** -41.414*** -21.724*** -23.578*** -33.953*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
UE*EXPERT -0.722** -0.691* -0.706 -0.728** -0.681** -0.605 
 (0.038) (0.062) (0.153) (0.025) (0.045) (0.213) 
UE*404b 1.231*** 1.214** 1.203** 1.267*** 1.267*** 1.296** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.042) (0.005) (0.007) (0.024) 
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Table 14: Continued 
  U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All earnings 
announcements 
Announcements 
within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 




within 45 days 
Announcements 
within 45 days & 
no SIC 6000 
       
N 3,459 3,371 2,827 3,585 3,486 2,906 
       
R-squared 0.096 0.094 0.091 0.091 0.090 0.086 
       
UE*D+UE*D*POST 0.285 0.485 0.445 0.290 0.530 0.379 
 (0.652) (0.490) (0.610) (0.629) (0.423) (0.647) 
       
UE*POST+UE*D*POST 1.488** 1.618** 1.646* 1.491**   1.618** 1.644* 
 (0.034) (0.044) (0.084) (0.027) (0.034) (0.077) 
       
 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests.  
P-values are reported in brackets. 
 




Table 15: Sample - Auditor Change Analysis - PCAOB Sanction 
Panel A: Sample Selection - All Big N Clients All Fiscal year-ends 
Companies with Audit Analytics and Compustat  
information to calculate auditor changes from 2005 to 2009 32,169  
Less: Companies with nonconsecutive years (666) 
Less: Companies with a non Big N auditor (5,060) 
Less: Companies that appear only once in the sample (1,045) 
Less: Companies with missing financial data  (10,359) 
 Sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients 15,039  
Less: Companies with a Big N auditor outside the U.S. (2,651) 
    
Sample of U.S. clients 12,388  
Panel B: Detail of Deloitte clients and Other Big N clients - All fiscal year-ends 
Deloitte Clients Other Big N Clients Total 
 Sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients - All fiscal year ends 3,391  11,648  15,039  
Less: Companies with a Big N auditor outside the U.S. (601) (2,050) (2,651) 
 Sample of U.S. clients - All fiscal year ends 2,790  9,598  12,388  
Panel C: Detail of  U.S. and Non U.S. clients - December year-end only 
Deloitte Clients Other Big N Clients Total 
 Sample of U.S. and Non U.S. clients  - All fiscal year ends 3,391  11,648  15,039  
Less: Companies with a non December year-end (1,011) (3,194) (4,205) 






Table 15: Continued 
Panel D: Detail of U.S. clients - December year-end only 
Deloitte Clients Other Big N Clients Total 
 Sample of U.S. clients  - All fiscal year ends 2,790  9,598  12,388  
Less: Companies with a non December year-end (912) (2,741) (3,653) 
 Sample of U.S. clients  - December year-end only 1,878  6,857  8,735  
Panel E: Detail of Auditor Changes - All fiscal year-ends 
Deloitte Clients Other Big N Clients Total 
Client dismissals - U.S. clients* 145 497 642 
Auditor resignations/Decline to stand for re-election - U.S. clients** 39 98 137 
Total Auditor Changes - U.S. Clients 184 595 779 
Client dismissals - Non U.S. clients*** 28 103 131 
Auditor resignations/Decline to stand for re-election - Non U.S. clients**** 7 26 33 
Total Auditor Changes - Non U.S. Clients 35 129 164 
*For December year-end only clients there are 94 for Deloitte and 307 for other Big N  
**For  December year-end only clients there are 23 for Deloitte and 60 for other Big N  
***For  December year-end only clients there are 25 for Deloitte and 79 for other Big N  










Table 16: Auditor Changes, Client Gains and Market Share – U.S. Clients 
  
Panel A:  Auditor market share  (all fiscal year-ends) 
DT 
Market 
Share %   EY 
Market 
Share %   KPMG 
Market 
Share %   PWC 
Market 
Share %   Total 
2004 1,187 23.5% 1,504 29.8% 1,059 21.0% 1,293 25.6% 5,043 100% 
2005 1,142 24.3% 1,452 30.9% 938 20.0% 1,162 24.8% 4,694 100% 
2006 1,099 24.8% 1,410 31.8% 872 19.7% 1,054 23.8% 4,435 100% 
2007 1,051 25.2% 1,360 32.6% 796 19.1% 961 23.1% 4,168 100% 
2008 1,005 25.2% 1,309 32.8% 750 18.8% 931 23.3% 3,995 100% 
2009 974 24.9% 1,260 32.2% 742 19.0% 934 23.9% 3,910 100% 
Total 6,458 8,295 5,157 6,335 26,245 
Panel B:  All auditor changes  (all fiscal year-ends) 
DT Freq. %   EY Freq. %   KPMG Freq. %   PWC Freq. %   Total 
2005 79 24.8% 94 29.5% 26 8.2% 120 37.6% 319 100% 
2006 64 23.3% 70 25.5% 26 9.5% 115 41.8% 275 100% 
2007 45 27.4% 36 22.0% 19 11.6% 64 39.0% 164 100% 
2008 42 35.0% 40 33.3% 16 13.3% 22 18.3% 120 100% 
2009 45 33.6% 40 29.9% 15 11.2% 34 25.4% 134 100% 
Total 275 280 102 355 1,012 
Panel C:  All auditor changes  (December year-end companies only) 
DT Freq. %   EY Freq. %   KPMG Freq. %   PWC Freq. %   Total 
2005 50 20.0% 54 21.6% 68 27.2% 78 31.2% 250 100% 
2006 32 17.7% 31 17.1% 44 24.3% 74 40.9% 181 100% 
2007 29 23.8% 21 17.2% 35 28.7% 37 30.3% 122 100% 
2008 29 31.2% 27 29.0% 23 24.7% 14 15.1% 93 100% 
2009 38 34.2% 28 25.2% 22 19.8% 23 20.7% 111 100% 






Table 16: Continued 
Panel D: Client gains (all fiscal year-ends) 
DT Freq. %   EY Freq. %   KPMG Freq. %   PWC Freq. %   Total 
2005 42 33.6% 36 28.8% 25 20.0% 22 17.6% 125 100% 
2006 43 26.9% 61 38.1% 34 21.3% 22 13.8% 160 100% 
2007 30 26.8% 43 38.4% 12 10.7% 27 24.1% 112 100% 
2008 16 17.4% 36 39.1% 26 28.3% 14 15.2% 92 100% 
2009 26 21.5% 30 24.8% 27 22.3% 38 31.4% 121 100% 
Total 157 206 124 123 121 
Panel E: Auditor resignations/Decline to stand for re-election (all fiscal year-ends) 
DT Freq. %   EY Freq. %   KPMG Freq. %   PWC Freq. %   Total 
2005 24 20.7% 27 23.3% 28 24.1% 37 31.9% 116 100.0% 
2006 12 21.8% 18 32.7% 5 9.1% 20 36.4% 55 100.0% 
2007 11 31.4% 8 22.9% 3 8.6% 13 37.1% 35 100.0% 
2008 5 55.6% 2 22.2% 1 11.1% 1 11.1% 9 100.0% 
2009 2 50.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 50.0% 4 100.0% 
Total 54 55 37 73 219 
 
 
The table presents descriptive information for the market share of each auditor, auditor changes and client gains during the sample period. The 
number of companies differs from what is reported in Table 15 because this table reflects auditor information before dropping companies that have 








Table 17:  Industry Frequency Distributions  - U.S. clients (December year-end only) 
Panel A: Industry detail  by auditor (Fama-French 12) 
DT Freq. %   EY 
Freq. 
%   KPMG 
Freq. 
%   PWC 
Freq. 
%   Total Freq. % 
Consumer Non-Durables 99 5.3% 59 2.1% 62 3.5% 98 4.3% 318 3.6% 
Consumer Durables 36 1.9% 64 2.3% 26 1.5% 50 2.2% 176 2.0% 
Manufacturing 211 11.2% 336 12.0% 126 7.1% 264 11.7% 937 10.7% 
Energy 104 5.5% 143 5.1% 126 7.1% 113 5.0% 486 5.6% 
Chemicals 72 3.8% 45 1.6% 48 2.7% 68 3.0% 233 2.7% 
Business Equipment 274 14.6% 477 17.0% 334 18.7% 447 19.8% 1,532 17.5% 
Telecommunications 80 4.3% 108 3.8% 101 5.7% 92 4.1% 381 4.4% 
Utilities 175 9.3% 30 1.1% 44 2.5% 158 7.0% 407 4.7% 
Shops 124 6.6% 192 6.8% 134 7.5% 124 5.5% 574 6.6% 
Healthcare 166 8.8% 645 23.0% 212 11.9% 373 16.5% 1,396 16.0% 
Finance 227 12.1% 273 9.7% 231 12.9% 223 9.9% 954 10.9% 
Other 310 16.5% 436 15.5% 343 19.2% 252 11.1% 1,341 15.4% 
Total 1,878  100% 2,808  100% 1,787 100% 2,262 100% 8,735 100% 
Panel B: Client dismissals (by industry ) 





Consumer Non-Durables 20 5.0% 298 3.6% 
Consumer Durables 8 2.0% 166 2.0% 
Manufacturing 38 9.5% 891 10.8% 
Energy 19 4.7% 466 5.6% 
Chemicals 6 1.5% 224 2.7% 
Business Equipment 78 19.5% 1427 17.3% 
Telecommunications 29 7.2% 350 4.2% 
Utilities 12 3.0% 394 4.8% 
Shops 24 6.0% 546 6.6% 
Healthcare 62 15.5% 1325 16.1% 
Finance 42 10.5% 902 10.9% 
Other 63 15.7% 1262 15.3% 





Table 17: Continued 
Panel C: Auditor resignations/ Decline to stand for re-election (by industry ) 
Change Freq. % 
Consumer Non-Durables 0 0.0% 
Consumer Durables 2 2.4% 
Manufacturing 8 9.6% 
Energy 1 1.2% 
Chemicals 3 3.6% 
Business Equipment 27 32.5% 
Telecommunications 2 2.4% 
Utilities 1 1.2% 
Shops 4 4.8% 
Healthcare 9 10.8% 
Finance 10 12.0% 
Other 16 19.3% 
Total 83 100% 
 
 
The table presents descriptive information for the industry portfolio composition of each Big N firm as well as the number and frequency % of 











Table 18: Descriptive Statistics – U.S. Clients – December year-end 
Descriptive statistics for firms dismissing their auditors 
  Client Dismissals     Client Dismissals   Test of Differences
a
 
Deloitte Clients (N=94) Other Big N Clients (N=307) Mean Median 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. (p-value) (p-value) 
GROWTH 0.166  0.050  0.550  0.069  0.022  0.450  0.120  0.216  
ABSDACC 0.142  0.085  0.166  0.146  0.083  0.178  0.834  0.853  
INVREC 0.225  0.168  0.207  0.236  0.178  0.206  0.641  0.546  
ROA (0.092) 0.012  0.369  (0.099) 0.003  0.321  0.862  0.580  
LOSS 0.468  0.000  0.502  0.492  0.000  0.501  0.688  0.687  
SIZE 5.373  5.147  1.924  5.265  5.284  1.812  0.620  0.768  
M&A 0.277  0.000  0.450  0.241  0.000  0.428  0.487  0.486  
MISMATCH 0.649  1.000  0.480  0.658  1.000  0.475  0.872  0.872  
NEG_OPINION 0.585  1.000  0.495  0.541  1.000  0.499  0.450  0.450  
ICWEAK 0.149  0.000  0.358  0.156  0.000  0.364  0.862  0.862  
TENURE 0.277  0.000  0.450  0.160  0.000  0.367  0.023** 0.011** 
EXPERT 0.245  0.000  0.432  0.362  0.000  0.481  0.036** 0.036** 
INST 0.481  0.508  0.337  0.466  0.479  0.333  0.696  0.668  
NEWFINC 0.567  0.142  1.121  0.538  0.127  1.065  0.820  0.947  
 
aTest of Differences present the p-values for mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon test) values. 
Refer to pages 33-34 for variable definitions. 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests
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Table 19: Auditor Change Analysis – PCAOB Sanction – December year-end clients 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
SWITCHit = βo + β1Dit-1 + β2POST + β3D it-1*POST + β4GROWTHit-1 + β5ABSDACCit-1 + β6INVRECit-1 + β7ROAit-1 + 
β8LOSSit-1 + β9SIZEit-1+ β10M&Ait-1 +  β11MISMATCHit-1+  β12NEG_OPINIONit-1 + β13ICWEAKit-1 +  β14TENUREit-1 + 
β15EXPERTit-1+ β16INSTit-1 + β17NEWFINCit+2 + β18TREND + ∑δnINDUSTRYn + εit 
U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













only & no 
SIC 6000 
        
        
 Intercept -0.644** -1.147*** -1.121*** -1.130*** -1.660*** -1.743*** 
  (0.048) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 D 0.058 -0.002 -0.044 0.024 -0.070 -0.120 
  (0.683) (0.992) (0.796) (0.848) (0.626) (0.433) 
 POST 0.190 0.119 0.104 0.161 0.069 0.067 
  (0.396) (0.619) (0.678) (0.409) (0.740) (0.759) 
 D*POST 0.451* 0.428* 0.465* 0.433** 0.516** 0.572** 
  (0.064) (0.098) (0.094) (0.041) (0.022) (0.017) 
 GROWTH -0.110 -0.306** -0.247* -0.116 -0.287*** -0.259** 
  (0.293) (0.021) (0.065) (0.185) (0.008) (0.019) 
 ABSDACC 0.393 0.401 0.454 0.449* 0.502* 0.563** 
  (0.184) (0.220) (0.174) (0.071) (0.067) (0.043) 
 INVREC 0.318 0.451 0.337 0.319 0.414 0.270 
  (0.256) (0.134) (0.329) (0.209) (0.135) (0.391) 
 ROA 0.111 0.197 0.206 -0.139 0.072 0.076 
  (0.642) (0.454) (0.452) (0.456) (0.739) (0.732) 
 LOSS 0.276** 0.239* 0.210 0.142 0.138 0.126 
  (0.031) (0.087) (0.158) (0.208) (0.264) (0.336) 
 SIZE -0.391*** -0.355*** -0.349*** -0.290*** -0.262*** -0.237*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 M&A 0.143 0.152 0.169 0.113 0.134 0.142 
  (0.221) (0.226) (0.201) (0.269) (0.222) (0.215) 
 MISMATCH 0.390*** 0.412*** 0.448*** 0.361*** 0.373*** 0.435*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
 NEG_OPINION 0.275** 0.185 0.194 0.249*** 0.191* 0.196* 
  (0.010) (0.110) (0.114) (0.008) (0.058) (0.064) 
 ICWEAK 1.163*** 0.877*** 0.752*** 1.123*** 0.835*** 0.724*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 TENURE -0.322*** -0.364*** -0.440*** -0.164 -0.156 -0.190 














Table 19: Continued 
 
 
   U.S. clients                                             U.S. & Non U.S. clients  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













only & no 
SIC 6000 
        
        
 EXPERT 0.282*** 0.310*** 0.279** 0.189** 0.185* 0.155 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.019) (0.046) (0.070) (0.147) 
 INST -0.219 -0.127 -0.062 -0.281* -0.161 -0.158 
  (0.246) (0.531) (0.777) (0.080) (0.351) (0.384) 
 NEWFINC 0.071 0.117** 0.110* 0.035 0.088* 0.081* 
  (0.158) (0.029) (0.054) (0.432) (0.060) (0.099) 
 TREND -0.358*** -0.257*** -0.278*** -0.308*** -0.211*** -0.228*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
        
 INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
 N 8,735 8,652 7,708 10,834 10,726 9,648 
        




        
 D + D*POST 0.509** 0.426** 0.421* 0.457*** 0.446** 0.452** 
  (0.011) (0.038) (0.058) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) 
 
 POST+ D*POST 0.641** 0.546* 0.569* 0.594** 0.585** 0.639** 
  (0.02) (0.065) (0.072) (0.013) (0.023) (0.019) 
 
 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests.  
P-values are reported in brackets. 
 










Table 20: Auditor Change Analysis – PCAOB Sanction - All fiscal year-end clients 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
SWITCHit = βo + β1Dit-1 + β2POST + β3Dit-1*POST + β4GROWTHit-1 + β5ABSDACCit-1 + β6INVRECit-1 + β7ROAit-1 + 
β8LOSSit-1 + β9SIZEit-1+ β10M&Ait-1 +  β11MISMATCHit-1+  β12NEG_OPINIONit-1 + β13ICWEAKit-1 +  β14TENUREit-1 + 
β15EXPERTit-1+ β16INSTit-1 + β17NEWFINCit+2 + β18TREND + ∑δnINDUSTRYn + εit 
U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












only & no 
SIC 6000 
        
 Intercept -0.528** -1.039*** -1.026*** -0.915*** -1.456*** -1.538*** 
  (0.045) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 D 0.006 -0.048 -0.073 -0.024 -0.104 -0.129 
  (0.958) (0.695) (0.564) (0.807) (0.354) (0.265) 
 POST -0.023 0.006 -0.014 -0.012 -0.039 -0.050 
  (0.897) (0.973) (0.941) (0.939) (0.814) (0.770) 
 D*POST 0.333 0.290 0.288 0.319* 0.376* 0.394* 
  (0.111) (0.189) (0.218) (0.084) (0.054) (0.054) 
 GROWTH -0.017 -0.141 -0.091 0.004 -0.099 -0.075 
  (0.832) (0.144) (0.347) (0.950) (0.215) (0.352) 
 ABSDACC 0.405* 0.302 0.349 0.354* 0.280 0.332 
  (0.078) (0.242) (0.182) (0.078) (0.213) (0.144) 
 INVREC 0.602*** 0.711*** 0.684*** 0.580*** 0.695*** 0.674*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) 
 ROA -0.007 0.069 0.091 -0.121 0.014 0.022 
  (0.971) (0.740) (0.671) (0.424) (0.937) (0.899) 
 LOSS 0.299*** 0.280** 0.276** 0.201** 0.188* 0.187* 
  (0.003) (0.011) (0.017) (0.027) (0.059) (0.072) 
 SIZE -0.381*** -0.345*** -0.344*** -0.308*** -0.276*** -0.257*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 M&A 0.108 0.148 0.158 0.085 0.119 0.127 
  (0.251) (0.142) (0.129) (0.314) (0.188) (0.174) 
 MISMATCH 0.396*** 0.473*** 0.484*** 0.391*** 0.452*** 0.486*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 NEG_OPINION 0.196** 0.114 0.121 0.230*** 0.180** 0.184** 
  (0.020) (0.212) (0.202) (0.002) (0.027) (0.030) 
 ICWEAK 1.076*** 0.820*** 0.742*** 1.044*** 0.792*** 0.718*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 TENURE -0.271*** -0.312*** -0.345*** -0.193** -0.214** -0.235** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.023) (0.022) (0.016) 
 EXPERT 0.201** 0.228** 0.204** 0.159** 0.150* 0.123 

















Table 20: Continued 
 
   U.S. clients                                             U.S. & Non U.S. clients  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













only & no 
SIC 6000 
        
        
 INST -0.433*** -0.382** -0.342** -0.394*** -0.325** -0.330** 
  (0.005) (0.020) (0.047) (0.003) (0.024) (0.027) 
 NEWFINC 0.053 0.098** 0.097** 0.017 0.065* 0.063* 
  (0.182) (0.019) (0.025) (0.624) (0.076) (0.091) 
 TREND -0.294*** -0.227*** -0.237*** -0.277*** -0.206*** -0.215*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
 N 12,388 12,251 11,187 15,039 14,869 13,627 
        
        




        
 D + D*POST 0.339* 0.242 0.215 0.295* 0.272* 0.265 
  (0.059) (0.191) (0.278) (0.060) (0.092) (0.118) 
 
 POST+ D*POST 0.310 0.296 0.274 0.307 0.338 0.345 
  (0.168) (0.220) (0.281) (0.124) (0.115) (0.122) 
 
        
 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests.  
P-values are reported in brackets.  
 


















Table 21: December  year-end clients – Highly litigated industries only 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
SWITCHit = βo + β1Dit-1 + β2POST + β3D it-1*POST + β4GROWTHit-1 + β5ABSDACCit-1 + 1 + β6SIZEit-1+ 
β7M&Ait-1 + β8ICWEAKit-1 + β9TENUREit-1  + β10NEWFINCit+2 + β11TREND + εit 
U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








      
 Intercept 0.660* 0.080 -0.061 -0.666* 
  (0.093) (0.850) (0.847) (0.053) 
 D 0.009 -0.109 -0.028 -0.228 
  (0.972) (0.726) (0.907) (0.436) 
 POST 0.587 0.371 0.438 0.272 
  (0.169) (0.410) (0.232) (0.484) 
 D*POST 1.009** 1.032** 0.975*** 1.143*** 
  (0.024) (0.034) (0.010) (0.006) 
 GROWTH -0.216 -0.471** -0.206 -0.363** 
  (0.191) (0.029) (0.150) (0.037) 
 ABSDACC 1.356*** 1.285** 1.351*** 1.213*** 
  (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.006) 
 SIZE -0.539*** -0.481*** -0.430*** -0.370*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 M&A 0.327* 0.337 0.209 0.204 
  (0.093) (0.118) (0.224) (0.282) 
 ICWEAK 1.194*** 0.651** 1.215*** 0.709*** 
  (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.007) 
 TENURE -0.320 -0.247 -0.106 0.007 
  (0.145) (0.313) (0.556) (0.973) 
 NEWFINC -0.215* -0.142 -0.173* -0.110 
  (0.078) (0.258) (0.089) (0.304) 
 TREND -0.598*** -0.437*** -0.489*** -0.342*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) 
      
 N 2,526 2,493 3,186 3,145 
 
 Pseudo R2 0.151 0.11 0.124 0.085 
 
 D + D*POST 1.018*** 0.924** 0.947*** 0.915*** 
  (0.005) (0.014) (0.001) (0.003) 
      
 POST+ D*POST 1.596*** 1.403** 1.413*** 1.416*** 
  (0.002) (0.013) (0.001) (0.004) 
 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests.  




Table 22: December year-end clients –Tenure greater than 3 years 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
SWITCHit = βo + β1Dit-1 + β2POST + β3D it-1*POST + β4GROWTHit-1 + β5ABSDACCit-1 + β6INVRECit-1 + β7ROAit-1 + 
β8LOSSit-1 + β9SIZEit-1+ β10M&Ait-1 + β11MISMATCHit-1+  β12NEG_OPINIONit-1 + β13ICWEAKit-1 + β14EXPERTit-1+ 
β15INSTit-1 + β16NEWFINCit+2 + β17TREND + ∑δnINDUSTRYn + εit 
 
U.S. clients                                            U.S. & Non U.S. clients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












only & no 
SIC 6000 
        
 Intercept -0.954*** -1.373*** -1.257*** -1.379*** -1.747*** -1.765*** 
  (0.009) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 D -0.156 -0.264 -0.294 -0.167 -0.328* -0.340* 
  (0.373) (0.182) (0.156) (0.300) (0.077) (0.079) 
 POST 0.133 0.043 0.013 0.196 0.062 0.047 
  (0.581) (0.866) (0.962) (0.368) (0.792) (0.846) 
 D*POST 0.689** 0.732** 0.745** 0.628** 0.776*** 0.776*** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006) 
 GROWTH -0.039 -0.263 -0.220 -0.037 -0.279* -0.253 
  (0.771) (0.125) (0.199) (0.755) (0.071) (0.102) 
 ABSDACC 0.597* 0.554 0.670* 0.613** 0.593* 0.698** 
  (0.074) (0.130) (0.068) (0.035) (0.067) (0.031) 
 INVREC 0.493 0.548 0.431 0.480 0.463 0.323 
  (0.118) (0.106) (0.260) (0.101) (0.147) (0.366) 
 ROA 0.217 0.264 0.257 -0.071 0.225 0.231 
  (0.431) (0.384) (0.408) (0.749) (0.395) (0.393) 
 LOSS 0.374*** 0.302* 0.241 0.238* 0.202 0.164 
  (0.009) (0.052) (0.142) (0.069) (0.159) (0.275) 
 SIZE -0.342*** -0.314*** -0.330*** -0.266*** -0.253*** -0.246*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 M&A 0.139 0.180 0.218 0.133 0.167 0.200 
  (0.294) (0.201) (0.135) (0.267) (0.192) (0.130) 
 MISMATCH 0.416*** 0.424*** 0.394** 0.434*** 0.420*** 0.432*** 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.022) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) 
 NEG_OPINION 0.413*** 0.330** 0.364*** 0.370*** 0.296** 0.325*** 
  (0.001) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.012) (0.009) 
 ICWEAK 0.956*** 0.740*** 0.679*** 1.007*** 0.789*** 0.726*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 EXPERT 0.225* 0.266** 0.225* 0.168 0.180 0.160 
  (0.059) (0.035) (0.088) (0.126) (0.123) (0.192) 
 INST -0.411* -0.327 -0.263 -0.417** -0.316 -0.304 
  (0.052) (0.147) (0.270) (0.026) (0.114) (0.147) 
 NEWFINC 0.053 0.086 0.090 0.056 0.103* 0.109* 
  (0.414) (0.204) (0.204) (0.312) (0.080) (0.074) 
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Table 22: Continued 
 
   U.S. clients                                             U.S. & Non U.S. clients  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













only & no 
SIC 6000 
        
        
 TREND -0.340*** -0.242*** -0.247*** -0.327*** -0.222*** -0.228*** 
  (0.000) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) (0.005) (0.006) 
 INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
 N 6,860 6,802 6,081 8,166 8,092 7,271 
 
        




        
 D + D*POST 0.533** 0.467** 0.451* 0.461** 0.448** 0.436** 
  (0.012) (0.034) (0.055) (0.016) (0.023) (0.037) 
 
 POST+ D*POST 0.822*** 0.775** 0.758** 0.824*** 0.838*** 0.823*** 
  (0.008) (0.020) (0.031) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) 
 
        
 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests.  
P-values are reported in brackets.  
 
Refer to pages 33-34 for variable definitions.
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Table 23: Replication of market model results from Dee et al. (2011) 
                                  
Panel A: Day (0)                                 
















N Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR  rank test N Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR  rank test (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Dee et al. (2011) 707 60.8% -0.463% <0.001*** -0.359% <0.001*** 2363 52.0% 0.042% 0.500 -0.066% 0.134 <0.001*** <0.001*** 
U.S. only clients 563 59.9% -0.354% 0.022** -0.312% 0.000*** 2104 52.3% 0.005% 0.940 -0.054% 0.062* 0.016** 0.033** 0.000*** 
U.S. & Non U.S. Clients 701 59.9% -0.313% 0.026** -0.325% 0.000*** 2520 52.3% -0.035% 0.568 -0.113% 0.003*** 0.041** 0.069* 0.001*** 
                                  
Panel B: Day (0,+1)                                 
















N Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR  rank test N Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR  rank test (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Dee et al. (2011) 707 57.9% -0.534% <0.001*** -0.280% 0.001*** 2363 53.8% -0.172% 0.026** -0.176% <0.001*** 0.022** 0.040** 
U.S. only clients 563 57.1% -0.441% 0.018** -0.293% 0.000*** 2104 53.9% -0.067% 0.701 -0.206% 0.000*** 0.287 0.144 0.105 














Table 23: Continued 
 
              
Panel C: Day (0,+2)                                 
















N Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR  rank test N Neg. (%) CAR (p-value) CAR  rank test (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Dee et al. (2011) 707 60.1% -0.833% <0.001*** -0.502% <0.001*** 2363 54.2% -0.376% <0.001*** -0.235% <0.001*** 0.022** 0.014** 
U.S. only clients 563 57.9% -0.616% 0.021** -0.479% 0.000*** 2104 54.5% -0.396% 0.032** -0.376% 0.000*** 0.564 0.495 0.349 
U.S. & Non U.S. Clients 701 57.9% 0.292% 0.730 -0.442% 0.000*** 2520 54.5% -0.296% 0.065* -0.298% 0.000*** 0.276 0.495 0.224 
                 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
aTest of Differences present the p-values for mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon test) values. 
*,**,*** Significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively, using two-tail tests 
 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the standard market model methodology using 250 trading days prior to the event date (December 10, 20007 – Day 0) 
(excluding the 10 days before Day 0) and the CRSP value-weighted return (with dividends) to substitute for the market return. The abnormal return for firm i on 
day t (ARit) is the difference between the firm’s return and the estimated return; the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of the abnormal returns over 




















Table 24: Replication of Schipper and Thompson analysis from Dee et al. (2011) 
Schipper and Thompson (1983) regressions 
Rpt = α + βpRmt  + ∑δpkEventkt + εpt      
Panel A: Day (0)  
    Deloitte Clients            
Other Big N 
Clients      
Dee et al. 
(2011) U.S. only clients 
U.S. &  
Non U.S. Clients 
Dee et al. 
(2011) U.S. only clients 
U.S. &  
Non U.S. 
Clients 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
    (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Constant -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 
(-1.95)* (-0.77) (-0.07) (-2.27)** (-2.27)** (-1.61) 
Rm 0.8662 0.9390 0.9697 0.9374 0.9315 0.9565 
(59.48)*** (40.82)*** (46.14)*** (55.94)*** (53.78)*** (57.23)*** 
Event -0.0045 -0.0036 -0.0031 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0004 
(t-statistic) - 
1.) no robust 
standard errors/ 
2.) robust 
standard errors (-1.96)** (-0.99)/(-14.35)*** (-0.94)/(-12.62)*** (-0.15) (0.01)/(-0.11) (-0.15)/(-1.6) 








Table 24: Continued 
Panel B: Day (0,+1)  
    Deloitte Clients            
Other Big N 
Clients      
Dee et al. 
(2011) U.S. only clients 
U.S. &  
Non U.S. Clients 
Dee et al. 
(2011) U.S. only clients 
U.S. &  
Non U.S. 
Clients 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
    (t-statistic)   (t-statistic)   (t-statistic)   (t-statistic)   (t-statistic)   (t-statistic) 
Constant -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 
(-1.92)* (-0.76) (-0.21) (-2.22)** (-2.25)** (-1.62) 
Rm 0.8630 0.9364 0.9704 0.9369 0.9314 0.9564 
(58.95)*** (40.59)*** (46.06)*** (55.81)*** (53.65)*** (57.09)*** 
Event -0.0025 -0.0021 0.0021 -0.0008 -0.0002 0.000 
(-1.52) (-0.8)/(-1.84)* (0.89)/(0.56) (-0.43) (-0.11)/(-0.77) (-0.00)/(-0.01) 












Table 24: Continued 
Panel C: Day (0,+2)  
    Deloitte Clients            
Other Big N 
Clients      
Dee et al. 
(2011) U.S. only clients 
U.S. &  
Non U.S. Clients 
Dee et al. 
(2011) U.S. only clients 
U.S. &  
Non U.S. 
Clients 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
    (t-statistic)   (t-statistic)   (t-statistic)   (t-statistic)   (t-statistic)   (t-statistic) 
Constant -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 
(-1.84)* (-0.73) (-0.19) (-2.16)** (-2.17)** (-1.55) 
Rm 0.8635 0.9369 0.9693 0.9368 0.9309 0.9559 
(59.32)*** (40.72)*** (46.07)*** (55.98)*** (53.81)*** (57.23)*** 
Event -0.0027 -0.0020 0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.001 
(-2.01)** (-0.94)/(-2.56)** (0.52)/(0.38) (-0.80) (-0.8)/(-1.45) (-0.59)/(-1.17) 
Adjusted R2 0.93   0.87   0.90     0.93   0.92   0.93 
 
Observations are  the daily portfolio of the  Deloitte clients or the other Big N clients for the 251 trading days from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007.  
Rpt  =  equally weighted portfolio return for all clients of Deloitte (or all other Big N clients) on day t 
Rmt = market return on day t (proxied by CRSP value-weighted index) 
Eventkt = a dummy variable equal to one for the event window and zero for all other days in the estimation period. The event date is December 10, 2007 (Day 0); 
the day of the release of the PCAOB sanction. 
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